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ABSTRACT 
In 1997 Indonesia experienced a severe financial crisis due to problems in its 
banking system. The central objective of this study is to analyze the Indonesian 
government’s banking system policies, identify the causes of the financial crisis and 
analyze the government’s efforts in response to the crisis. This thesis investigates the 
government’s policies and its efforts in reviving the banking sector by using archival 
research, as well as a literature search of books, magazine articles, Internet articles, 
newspaper articles, and other library information sources. A program of recapitalization 
and restructurization of the banking system was a prime factor in the economic recovery 
in Indonesia. One lesson learned was that the central bank, as the monetary authority was 
not free from external pressure, especially from the government. As a result, policies 
were adopted to respond to immediate problems as they arose without consideration of 
broader economic consequences, which in turn created other unforeseen problems. When 
a new Indonesian government rose to power, it improved the legal foundation of the 
monetary authority to make any decisions, by clarifying its power and duties, and 
protecting it from external intervention or pressures. The monetary authority now has the 
independence and power to implement based on sound economic principles. 
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A major financial crisis in Asia spread to Indonesia in late 1997 and continued 
through the first half of 1998. The crisis in Indonesia was aggravated by internal factors, 
rooted in unsound banking practices. Large amount of offshore borrowings had been 
made and now had to be repaid at a time when the money supply (Foreign exchange 
reserves) was dwindling. Currency speculation and capital flight by Indonesian 
conglomerates led to an excessive devaluation of the currency. That devaluation, in turn, 
caused pervasive economic turmoil. Many large corporation shut down their production 
operations because the prices of raw materials had risen to prohibitive levels. The 
number of performing loans increased, millions of workers were laid off, and the overall 
quality of life deteriorated as the GDP per capita dropped sharply. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the government’s policies and its efforts to 
overcome and resolve the monetary and currency crisis that occurred in Indonesia in 
1997, and to review the existing regulations on the banking sector that were considered to 
have contributed to these conditions. This study includes an analysis of the underlying 
causes of the monetary and currency crisis. These problems were both external and 
internal to Indonesia. Externally, the Indonesia financial crisis happened as a result of 
declining exports, especially when oil prices dropped, and a tremendous amount of 
uncontrolled of offshore short- term loans made by private sector. Internally, the 
1 
monetary authority was in a weak position in terms of its independence and clearly 
vulnerable to pressures, which resulted in poor supervision of the banking industry, 
inadequate enforcement of banking laws, and a lack of transparency due to banks not 
disclosing their financial condition. All these factors contributed to the financial crisis in 
Indonesia. 
C. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis focuses on the analysis of the Indonesian government efforts in 
reviving the banking sector, and on its delegation of authority and responsibility to the 
BRA to recapitalize and to restructure the banking system. The scope also includes a 
review and analysis of: 
0 Review and identify the development of the financial institutions in Indonesia. 
0 Review and identify the effects of the Asian financial crisis on Indonesia. 
Identify the weaknesses and distortions of the Indonesian Central Bank. 
Identify the weaknesses of the government regulation about the banking 
system. 
The methodology used in this thesis consists of archival research, as well as a literature 
search of books, magazine articles, Internet articles, newspaper articles, and other library 
sources. All data and information are analyzed to draw conclusions. 
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C. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The following is a brief summary of the discussion in each of the chapters. 
Chapter II gives an overview of the development financial institutions in 
Indonesia as a means of facilitating world trade. The financial institution in this emerging 
economy resulted in a volatile reaction to the Asian financial crisis. 
Chapter III identifies the internal causes of the financial crisis in Indonesia and 
also gives a description of the role of the monetary authority and the effect of government 
intervention on the monetary authority. 
Chapter IV gives a description of the government’s efforts to overcome and to 
resolve the financial crisis by focusing on recapitalization and restructurization of’ the 
banking sector, on the legal foundation for the monetary authority, and on modifications 
made to the existing regulations on banking sector. 
Chapter V presents an analysis of the government’s banking policies in response 
to the financial crisis, especially in reviving the banking sector. 
Finally, Chapter VI presents the conclusion and recommendations. 
3 
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11. BACKGROUND 
This chapter will trace the development of the Indonesian financial institutions 
from 1967 to the financial crisis in Indonesia in 1997. The Indonesian government, as is 
common in developing countries, acted to accelerate and initiate the development of 
financial institutions. Since Indonesia has been adopting an open market policy, external 
factors and world trade patterns have influenced the development of the financial 
institutions. The Asian financial crisis has directly impacted the Indonesian economy, 
especially the banking sector. Indeed, the contagion effects of this crisis spread out 
widely in the region, including Indonesia. The last section of this chapter explains the 
Indonesian monetary authorities’ efforts in managing and defending the nation’s financial 
stability to halt the contagion effects. 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN INDONESIA 
During President Soekarno’s administration, Bank Indonesia (BI) was merely a 
payment agency for the government and under the control of the President. When 
President Soeharto took over the government in 1967, Indonesia entered a new era of 
developing the banking system. To provide some autonomy for BI, President Soeharto 
enacted Law No. 13 of 1968, which dealt with the Central Bank. The BI, as the central 
bank, had a major responsibility for supervising banks and other credit-granting 
institutions, and for setting an appropriate legal structure for banks. (Cole & Slade, 1996, 
P.37) 
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The financial sector has dominated the economic activities in most countries, 
especially in developing countries such as Indonesia. The financial institution’s 
performance can be used as a measure of a country’s economic condition. The 
development of financial institutions in Indonesia can be categorized into four significant 
events : 
Opening the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
Establishing indirect monetary instruments 
Establishing Nonbank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) 
The Banking Law in 1992 
1. Opening the Jakarta Stock Exchange 
The government’s primary concern in promoting the economic growth was that 
the private sector in the nation was far behind the state’s enterprises. To encourage the 
private sector to grow, the government needed to be involved in solving their problems. 
It was determined that the private sector needed more funds to expand production. In 
order to raise funds from the public, the government issued a Presidential Decree in 
December 1976. 
Basically, the Presidential Decree was intended to activate the Capital Market 
Executive Supervisory Agency (BAPEPAM). “BAPEPAM is a government agency with 
three responsibilities: to operate the stock exchange, to evaluate the documents of the 
companies proposing to raise funds from the public, and to carry out government policy.” 
(Cole & Slade, 1996, p.153) 
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To carry out the mandates as instructed in the Presidential Decree, BAPEPAM 
was to establish an equity market or capital market. On August 10, 1977, BAPEPAM 
established the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) with Semen Cibinong as the first listed 
company, issuing shares worth Rp. 1.8 billion. To promote and to advertise the JSE, 
BAPEPAM allowed all financial institutions, both domestic and foreign, to get involved 
in trading their shares. “Total share market capitalization grew from Rp.2.7 billion in 
1977 to Rp. 482 billion at the end of 1988, and then to nearly Rp.104 trillion at the end 
1994.” (Cole & Slade, 1996, p. 167) 
BAPEPAM has been considerably constrained in its direct intervention. First, 
BAPEPAM issued the rules requiring preemptive rights, which means existing 
stockholders have the opportunity to purchase shares of a new issue before it is offered to 
others. Second, BAPEPAM recognized that stock exchanges are self-regulatory 
organizations. BAPEPAM must approve any changes in stock exchange rules in advance. 
Third, BAPEPAM also set the rules for allocating initial public offerings (IPOs) in an 
attempt to allocate shares to small domestic investors. 
The Presidential Decree also created DANAREKSA as a state agent of economic 
development, which has a specific goal to spread the ownership of shares to small 
investors in Indonesia through investment funds. DANAREKSA was given privileged 
access to new issues of stocks and the right to set up investment funds, and it also served 
as a privileged underwriter, brokeddealer and investment funds manager. 
“DANAREKSA now is the holding company for three wholly owned subsidiaries: 
7 
DANAREKSA SECURITIES, DANAREKSA FUND MANAGEMENT, and 
DANAREKSA FINANCE.” (Cole & Slade, 1996, p.217) 
2. Developing Indirect Monetary Instruments 
In accordance with the credit ceiling removal, the BI subsequently issued new 
money market securities, and the BI also became a buyer of bank-endorsed or bank-issued 
commercial paper, as well as a buyer and seller of foreign exchange through foreign- 
exchange-swap contracts. 
The intent of the monetary policies was .that SBPU (promissory notes issued by 
banks) and swaps (BI’s facility in converting foreign currency into domestic currency) 
were used primarily as quantitative instruments of monetary policy designed to control 
the money supply. The SPBUs were not allowed to develop as a liquid financial 
instrument. The used of the SBPUs was rising during that period: 
The SBPUs were essentially a standardized banker’s acceptance, which BI 
was prepared to purchase at a discount from the banks. The volume of 
SBPUs held by BI rose from $ 0.1 billion to $ 0.5 billion in 1983, 
indicating the amount of reserved money supplied to the banks by BI 
through this channel. (Cole 8z Slade, 1996, p.50). 
The certificates of Bank Indonesia (SBI) initially had maturities of 30 and 90 days and 
were sold each week, ostensibly through an auction, but in fact at cut-off discount rates 
determined by the BI. The demand for SBI was low due to its yield, which was 
significantly lower than bank lending rates. There were no requirements for holding 
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liquid reserves. “The SBI, on the other hand, was a fixed interest rate instrument used for 
liquidity adjustment, primarily by the state banks.” (Cole & Slade, 1996, p.5 1). 
A third money market instrument used by BI during this period was the foreign 
exchange swap facility. ‘The BI set a swap premium at a uniform rate of 5.25 % per 
m u m ,  which was less than the difference between the US Dollar LlBOR (London 
Interbank Offer Rate) and the domestic Rupiah deposit rates.” (Cole & Slade, 1996, p.51) 
This resulted in strong demand for swaps and the BI responded by putting a ceiling on the 
amount of swaps it would enter into with each bank. 
3. Establishment of Non-Bank Institutions (NBFIs) 
To promote the money and capital markets, the Minister of Finance authorized the 
establishment of a new category of financial institutions, known as nonbank financial 
institutions (NBFIs). Since the indigenous Indonesians were not familiar with this type 
of entity, the government required each NBFI to be in the form of a joint venture with 
foreign partners. There were three categories of NBFIS: 
a. Three Development Finance Corporations (DFCs). These entities 
dealt in medium and long-term financing and purchase equity. 
b. Nine Investment Finance Corporations (IFCs). To serve as 
intermediaries and underwriters, which could help to develop long-term 
debt instruments. 
c. Others, which would be regulated later on. There were two entities, 
which could be grouped in this category; PT. Papan Sejahtera and PT. 
Sarana Bersama Pembiayaan Indonesia. (Suyatno, Marala, & Abdullah & 
others, 1999, p. 13) 
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Considering their significant contributions toward competitive businesses and economic 
growth, the BI gave them the responsibility to serve as agents and market makers in the 
SBUSBPU markets. 
4. The New Banking Law in 1992 
The Indonesian Government enacted the Act No. 7 of 1992 concerning the 
banking system. This Act was intended to provide a legal basis for regulating the 
banking industry, insurance, and private pension funds. 
a. Banking Industry 
The Banking Law provided for two categories of banks, General Banks 
and Peoples’ Credit Banks (BPRs). These banks were described as stated in the Act No. 7 
of 1992: 
General Banks were authorized to engage in most types of normal 
commercial banking businesses, although special authorization is required 
to engage in foreign exchange business, including taking deposits and 
making loans denominated in foreign exchange and trading in foreign 
exchange. Peoples’ Credit Banks are basically small-scale savings banks. 
They are limited in term of location, functions, and portfolio composition. 
They are precluded from taking demand deposits and participating in the 
payment system. The main role of Peoples’ Credit Banks is to take time 
and savings deposits and to extend credit. (Cole 8z Slade, 1996, 129) 
These rural financial institutions at least made it possible to provide outlets for savings of 
rural people and to provide small or medium size loans. 
To accommodate high demand from various Islamic organizations, the 
government, through the Act No. 7 of 1992, introduced the profit sharing bank. In their 
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view, based on their religion, interest resulting from depositing money in a bank is not 
allowed. But they could earn a profit if the bank was able to make profit by circulating 
the money into businesses. The term profit sharing is derived from the profit that a bank 
can make and then divide equally between the bank and the money owner. 
Cole & Slade (1996) described the profit sharing bank: 
This type of bank, under the category of general bank, is subject to the 
same regulations as other general banks. Its operation in investment and 
other services is similar to those of ordinary commercial banks, but 
depositors are actually investors, who make a return only if the banks 
make a profit. The law recognizes that this financial return can be on the 
basis of a sale or purchase principle in accordance with Islamic law rather 
than on the basis of interest on financial investment. (Cole & Slade 1996, 
p.134) 
b. Insurance Company 
Historically, insurance companies have been operating since 1957, when 
the Indonesian Insurance Council or Dewan Asuransi Indonesia (DAQ was established. 
“In the early years, membership in DAI was compulsory and a recommendation by DAI 
was necessary to get a license from the Minister of Finance.”(Cole & Slide, 1996, p 239) 
The DAI set insurance tariff levels, which then had to be approved by the Minister of 
Finance. The DAI also acted as arbitrator in disputes. “In 1968, the Minister of Finance 
tried to activate the private sector by removing the monopoly of the government on all 
objects of insurance, but in practice state institutions continued to buy insurance from 
state insurance firms.’’ (Cole & Slide 1996, p. 239) 
Eventually, foreign firms were permitted to engage in general insurance 
businesses in Indonesia, but they were required to handle reinsurance business in 
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Indonesia. Insurance activities began to grow more rapidly, as did the entire financial 
system. Life insurance in particular has shown a fivefold increase in assets over the 
period and has become an important player in several markets. (Cole & Slide 1996, p. 
242) 
C. Private Pension Funds 
As part of raising the public funds to stimulate economic growth, the 
government authorized the establishment of private pension funds. Cole & Slade (1996) 
acknowledge: 
The Ministry’s objectives in putting forward the pension law was: to 
establish the right of participants; to provide a regulatory standard, which 
would assure the ultimate receipt of pension benefits; to make certain that 
pension benefits were used as a source of continuing income for retirees 
and to provide proper governance for the pension funds; to encourage 
mobilization of saving in the form of long-term pension funds; to see that 
such funds were not retained and used by employers for possible risky or 
unsound investment, but instead would flow into the financial market and 
be subject to risk reducing requirements. (Cole & Slade, 1996, p.250) 
Private pension programs have also been offered in various forms by 
employers through the years, but consisted almost exclusively of a lump-sum payment 
upon retirement. Most state-owned enterprises had their own pension funds. “By the end 
of November 1993, there were 521 licensed pension funds, of which 508 were employer- 
managed pension funds and 13 independent funds.” (Cole & Slade, 1996, p. 261) 
B. THE EAST ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The East Asian financial crisis that occurred in the second semester of 1997 to the 
second semester of 1998, was conspicuous in several ways. The crisis hit the most rapidly 
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growing economies in the world and damaged their fundamental economy badly. It was 
the sharpest financial crisis to hit the developing countries since the Mexican financial 
crisis. It was the largest financial bailout in history, since those countries were required 
to recapitalize and to restructure their financial institutions, especially in the banking 
sector. 
In their research into the crisis, Radelet and Sach (1998) admit, “the basic 
diagnosis of the Asian financial crisis was that East Asia had exposed itself to financial 
chaos because its financial systems were riddled by insider dealing, corruption, and weak 
corporate governance, which in turn had caused inefficient investment spending and had 
weakened the stability of the banking system.” (Radelet & Sach, 1998,~. 1) 
Most economic experts believed that the East Asian financial crisis occurred not 
only from the internal weaknesses, but also from the changes in the world trade pattern. 
“There were some explanations for the East Asian financial crises that could be 
identified, such as: (1) shifts in international market conditions; (2) growing weaknesses 
and mismanagement in the Asian economies; and (3) instabilities intrinsic in the 
international capital markets.” (Radelet & Sach, 1998, p. 1-18) 
1. Shifts in International Market Conditions 
International trade had a significant contribution to the East Asian crisis. 
Southeast Asian countries had lost their competitiveness with other countries. The 
following explanation from Radelet & Sach (1998, p. 19) gives the impression that cheap 
labor alone cannot ensure a continuing competitive advantage: 
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There was a new global glut in labor-intensive manufactured exports, 
precisely the kind that fueled East Asia’s growth in the past generation. 
This glut would be reflected in slower export earnings in labor-intensive 
countries and declining terms of trade for labor-intensive products, such as 
apparel, footwear, steel, and consumer electronics. World prices for . 
manufactured exports fell about 2% in 1996 (IMF, 1997). Semiconductors 
were hit especially hard, when prices fell by as much as 80% in 1996 
before beginning to rebound. (BIS, 1997). 
The rapid growth in electronics production in East Asia, coupled with the addition of 
China and Mexico to these markets, created excess productive capacity and contributed to 
price declines. Price behavior follows the economic law that, if the supply of products 
increased sharply, ceteris paribus, the price of those products would be lower than before. 
In addition, some other countries were offering cheaper prices for similar products. The 
East Asian countries found that China, “the sleeping giant,” has weakened their exports. 
Radelet & Sach (1998) confmed the growing competitive pressure, especially from 
China: 
A further influence might have been that the economic rise of China may 
have dramatically shifted export-oriented production away from South 
East Asia. Increasing exports from $20 billion in 1986 to $150 billion in 
1996 made China the eleventh largest exporter in the world. Chinese 
f m s  compete directly against other firms in the region in textiles, apparel, 
and electronics, and in other specialized products. China’s share of 
garment exports surged from 37% in 1990 to 60% in 1996, and its share of 
electronics exports jumped from 12% to 18%. (Radelet & Sach, 1998, 
P.20) 
The East Asian countries not only faced competition from inside their region, but also 
were influenced by other regions in the world as well. The increased interest rate in the 
U.S. over the European banks and the passage of NAFTA contributed to the declining 
exports of the East Asian countries. As Radelet & Sach assert: 
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The passage of NAFTA and the dramatic surge of Mexico’s exports may 
have resulted in intense new competition for East Asia. Mexico’s total 
exports soared from $52 billion in 1993 to $96 billion in 1996, with gains 
in several areas that directly compete with East Asian countries. The sharp 
real appreciation of the U.S. dollar against the European currencies and the 
Yen after 1994 may also have played a role. Since all of the Southeast 
Asian currencies were effectively pegged to the dollar, each appreciated 
significantly against the yen as the yeddollar rate moved from V/$ 85 in 
June 1995 to W$ 127 in April 1997. (Radelet & Sach, 1998, p.20) 
Probably each of these factors contributed to the export slowdown in 1996, which, in 
turn, raised concerns among Southeast Asia’s creditors about the ability of firms in these 
countries to repay their debts. 
2. Mismanagement in the Asian Economies 
Many of the problems had their origins in the financial liberalization policy in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s that led to a quite rapid expansion of the financial sector and 
enthusiastic lending by foreign creditors. Entry requirements into financial services were 
loosened, allowing new private banks to open. Banks were given greater leeway in their 
lending decisions, and stock and bond markets began to grow and develop. Importantly, 
banks and financial institutions had new freedoms to raise funds offshore. This 
combination led to a rapid expansion in both offshore borrowing and domestic lending, 
with a resulting investment boom. In Thailand, Korea, and Malaysia, bank claims on the 
private sector increased by more than 50% relative to the GDP in just seven years. 
(Radelet & Sach, 1998, p.21) 
Surprisingly, however, property prices showed almost no change between 1992 
and the end of 1996. These prices fell sharply in early 1997, helping to set off the crisis. 
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“The combination of the rapid inflow of foreign capital, the appreciating real exchange 
rate, and the rapid growth in bank lending undoubtedly deteriorated the quality of 
investments in Asia.” (Radelet & Sach, 1998, p. 22-24.) 
The East Asian financial crisis was quite unpredictable. A few years prior to the 
crisis, most economic experts forecasted high economic growth for the East Asian 
countries. They called this phenomenon the “Asian Miracle.” In the eyes of the 
investors, making investment in a country with high economic growth is more favorable. 
As a result, the East Asian countries became targets of foreign investors. Radelet & Sach 
(1998, p. 13), in the “ Onset of the East Asian Crisis,” explained that the crisis was 
unpredicted. 
One reason that the crisis was largely unanticipated by international 
lenders and most market observers was that many of the signals that 
analysts normally associate with impending problems showed little sign of 
deterioration. Most fundamental aspects of macroeconomic management 
remained sound throughout the early 1990s. Government budgets 
registered regular surpluses in each country. While governments have been 
too enthusiastic in promoting large-scale Infrastructure investments 
financed by foreign inflows, and while there are no doubt important fiscal 
liabilities outside of the formal budget, all five countries maintained a 
fairly responsible budgetary position between 1990 and 1996. Partly as a 
result of this budgetary prudence, inflation rates have been below 10% 
across the region during the 1990s. Similarly, domestic savings and 
investment rates were very high throughout the region, suggesting that 
even if foreign capital flows slowed, robust growth could continue. 
Foreign exchange reserves at the end of 1996 were well over four months 
of imports in each country except South Korea, where they were 
equivalent to 2.8 months of imports. In Thailand, official figures suggest 
that reserves reached a seemingly very healthy $38.6 billion at the end of 
1996, equivalent to over seven months of imports. 
. 
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3. Instabilities in the International Capital Markets 
The third possible explanation of the Asian financial crisis is that the crisis was 
triggered by drmatic swings in creditor expectations about the behavior of other 
creditors, thereby creating a self-fulfilling, though possibly individually rational, financial 
panic. Trade deficits and declining exports on one hand, and rising nonperforming loans 
and declining price in property sector on the other, made the fundamental economic 
condition vulnerable in these countries. Foreign investors realized that they would have a 
greater loss if they did not dump their domestic shares. As a consequence, capital flight 
occurred. Radelet & Sach (1998) described it. 
The net capital flows to the five East Asian countries were rising prior to 
the crisis. Private net inflows to these five countries soared, rising fiom 
$40.5 billion in 1994 to $92.8 billion in 1996. Suddenly, in 1997, the long 
period of inflow abruptly reversed, with a net outflow of around $12.1 
billion. A remarkable unexpected swing of capital outflow of $105 billion 
represents around 11% of the pre-crisis dollar GDP of the five Asian 
countries. (Radelet & Sach, 1998, p.2) 
The withdrawal of foreign funds triggered a chain reaction, which quickly 
developed into a financial panic. The exchange rate decline associated with the 
I withdrawal itself sparked new withdrawals of foreign exchange, as domestic borrowers 
with unhedged currency positions rushed to buy dollars. Throughout Southeast Asia, few 
f m s  had hedged their exposure, since they believed that the government would retain a 
stable exchange rate. As the currency depreciated, foreign lenders became more 
concerned that their customers would be unable to repay their debts and began to call in 
their loans, reinforcing the decline. (Radelet & Sach, 1998, p.22) 
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The withdrawal of funds also set off a liquidity squeeze and a sharp rise in interest 
rates. As a result, firms that were profitable before the crisis found it difficult to obtain 
working capital or to remain profitable with significantly higher interest rates. The 
investor panic was triggered by the following explanations: 
Offshore creditors became concerned about the profitability of their customers and 
grew increasingly reluctant to roll over short-term loans. The lack of clear bankruptcy 
laws and workout mechanisms added to the withdrawal of credit, since foreign lenders 
feared they would have little recourse to collect on bad loans. Non-performing loans rose 
quickly, and depositors withdrew their funds either out of concern over the safety of the 
banking system or in order to meet pressing foreign exchange obligations. The losses on 
foreign exchange exposure and the rise in non-performing loans eroded the capital base of 
the banks, adding to their stress. (Radelet & Sach, 1998, p.20) 
According to the central hypothesis of financial market instability, a country with 
a high ratio of short-term debt to short-term assets (measured as the ratio of BIS short- 
term debt to the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank) would be more vulnerable 
to crisis. 
C. THE IMPACT OF THE ASIAN CRISIS ON THE INDONESIAN 
BANKING SYSTEM 
As currencies were falling in Southeast Asia, the Indonesian government was 
urged to take steps to halt the contagion effects. Although economic fundamentals 
remained strong in Indonesia, this fact did not mean that Indonesia was excluded from the 
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currency crisis. In order to defend the currency’s stability and economic wealth, the 
Indonesian government asked for the IMF’s assistance and tried to protect the Rupiah. 
1. Protecting the Rupiah 
The governor of the Bank Jndonesia announced that devaluation of the Yuan 
(China’s currency) and Bath (Thailand’s currency) had a direct effect on the Rupiah, since 
Indonesia had too much offshore borrowing. About $43 billion of that would have to be 
repaid shortly, while the national reserves exchange was about $20 billion. This shortage 
of the supply of dollars would not satisfy the demand and was causing creditors to panic. 
“In addition, the IMF warned the Indonesian government that there were serious and 
growing weaknesses in the banking sectors.”(Mann, 1998, p. 16) 
To protect the Rupiah, the government, supported by the IMF, was urged to widen 
the band for the Rupiah from 8% to 12% and then to float the rupiah and abandon the 
band completely with the rupiah at 2,755 to the US Dollar. The government also was 
raising interest rates over 50’%. Commercial banks were allowed to reduce their foreign 
reserves from 5% to 3% in order to increase the supply of dollars. An attempt was made 
to further increase the supply of the US dollar by opening up swap facilities to exporters. 
The reason behind this was to absorb the current supply of money by encouraging people 
to save their money in banks and to reduce the conversion of rupiahs into dollars. 
To calm the nervous creditors and to boost confidence, restrictions on foreign 
share ownership, previously set at a maximum of 49%, except for banking and securities, 
were removed. The government also announced that public sector projects would be 
19 
reviewed with a view to postponement, especially those with high import content. There 
were 15 major development projects worth more than $34 billion. “Most of the projects 
were in the sectors of energy, mining, transport and public works, and even included 
certain luxurious projects for the President‘s family.” (Mann, 1998, p.41) The next day 
the Rupiah remained stable and stock prices strengthened. First deputy Managing 
Director of the IMF, Stanley Fischer, was quoted as saying, “The IMF has been impressed 
by the fact that Indonesia has moved decisively in the foreign exchange market, on the 
budget and on structural measures in economy.” (Mann, 1998, p. 40) 
2. Market Failure or Banking Failure? 
Two months later, Indonesia’s private sector was already complaining from the 
hardship inflicted by persistently high interest rates. Debt burden was higher because of 
high interest rates, and debt repayment was more difficult because of declining sales 
revenue. The demand for property declined as the seller increased the price. Mann (1998) 
emphasized this situation: 
As interest rates rose, less and less property could be sold. So more and 
more developers faced difficulties servicing and repaying the short-term 
loans they had made to develop property. Throughout the last quarter of 
1997, property sales plummeted, chronic oversupply set in, and developers 
faced bankruptcy. (Mann, 1998, p. 3 1) 
Share prices continued to tumble as the market saw companies getting into deep 
difficulties as a result of the interest rates being used to protect the currency. 
Rising interest rates forced private commercial banks to maintain their 
competitiveness by offering interest rates far above those of state banks to attract 
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depositors. The banking system quickly came under intense pressure. Lending rates fell 
' steeply. Many companies had loans from the private banks and continued to suffer from 
punishing interest rates. Of course, new borrowers could not dream of asking for loans 
from private banks, thus contributing to the drying up of loans. Also depositors now 
wanted to be quite sure that their money was safe, since depositors had no infomation 
about safety. Non-performing loans were soaring as more companies tumbled into 
bankruptcy. By late October, the problem of liquidity had become acute. Mann (1998) 
admits: 
There were rumors that the IMF was asking to close 50 banks, including 
the reliable Jakarta Foreign Banking Sources, which was listed as number 
42. It was hard to see how this would reassure creditors or investors or 
even the market. On October 31, sixteen of those banks were closed and 
9,000 employees were laid off with only three months severance pay. The 
Minister of Finance confirmed that bad debts meant that all the banks had 
more liabilities than assets. The terminated banks were Harapan Sentosa, 
Andromeda, Pacific, Astria Raya, Guna International, Dwipa Semesta, 
Kosagraha Semesta, Industri, Jakarta, Citrahasta, South East Asia, 
Mataram Dhanata, Pinaesan, Anrico, Umum Majapahit, and Sejahtera 
Bank Umum. Several of the closed banks were run by politically 
connected business figures. On the day bank closure was announced, the 
stock market again fell and the rupiah was described as dithering at Rp. 
3,625 to the US dollar. (Mann, 1998, p. 53) 
3. Poison Pills from IMF 
The combination of high interest rates and a constantly devaluing currency were 
inflicting great damage on the economy and were further revealing critical weaknesses in 
the way most business was done in Indonesia. Layoffs were already taking place, and 
projects and production were scaled back. The rupiah continued its fall, reaching Rp. 
6,000 to the US dollar a few days before the Christmas holiday. (Mann, 1998, p.87) 
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In addition, Indonesian export trade found a new barrier; most foreign banks 
refused letters of credit issued by Indonesian Companies. “Bisnis Indonesia” reported 
that not only Japanese banks but also all foreign banks would only accept “sight LCs” 
from Indonesia, in other words, no cash, no goods. If Indonesia’s export trade halted, a 
major still-viable source of foreign exchange would dry up, threatening not only the 
national economy but also the solvency of exporters themselves. According to Standard 
& Poor, “Indonesian banks were in such poor shape that they needed $ 15 billion in fresh 
capital, and their non-performing loans would rise to 20 % with a corresponding erosion 
of the quality of bank assets.” (Mann, 1998, p. 133) 
In the money market, the continuing high demand for dollars dragged down the 
rupiah still further, reaching Rp. 10,500 to the US dollar. The government realized that 
steps had to be taken to halt the rupiah melt down. The most important key to solving the 
crisis was restoring international confidence by following the IMF recommendations. The 
following list of recommendations by the IMF caused more severe impacts, as Mann 
(1998) believed: 
After a signing ceremony with the IMF, the government announced orders 
to implement an impressive list of reforms which: 
Eliminated exemptions for import duty, VAT and luxury sales tax 
relating to the Timor car. 
Abolished the clove monopoly and liberalized the import of ships. 
Permitted the products of foreign industrial investors to be sold in the 
retail market and allowed them to operate in the retail sector. 
Freed plywood producers and wood product manufactures to sell 
directly to foreign buyers. 
Restricted the activities of the state Logistics Agency (BULOG) 
The majority of these IMF-inspired measures were ideological and aimed 
at promoting free market practices. (Mann, 1998, p.135) 
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The IMF mandates that Indonesia curtail the amount of subsidies provided to 
people with lower incomes and open up the entire retail sector to foreign penetration were 
outright harmful. The next day the rupiah fell, to close at Rp. 17,000 to the US dollar. 
The problem was massive dollar buying, and the dollars were now in even shorter supply 
as offshore banks operating out of the financial centers of Singapore and Hong Kong 
choked off the supply for fear of a banking collapse in Indonesia. (Mann, 1998, p. 135) 
D. SUMMARY 
To summarize the major aspects of this chapter, we see clearly that the 
development of the financial institutions in Indonesia, in line with the trade reform policy, 
was designed to attract and to facilitate foreign investors. Obviously, investors’ 
confidence is a pre-condition to investors participating in Indonesian businesses, and this 
confidence is also necessary to boost economic activities. The four significant events in 
developing financial institutions in Indonesia inevitably reflect the need of foreign 
investors to support the nation’s economic development. Unfortunately, the disadvantage 
of an open economy forces a country to depend on other countries. As a result, global 
effects become unavoidable. The Asian financial crisis is a clear example of the 
dependency resulting from trade among countries. Equally unfortunate, the involvement 
of foreign investors and the international trade has specific risks, which must be managed 
seriously. Failure in risks handling erodes the investors’ confidence, and the withdrawal 
of their funds is inevitable. The next chapter will describe the internal factors that 
contributed to the financial crisis in Indonesia. 
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111. CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN INDONESIA 
In the previous chapter, the external factors, namely the world market factors, 
were seen as the main culprit of the Asian financial crisis, including Indonesia. This 
chapter, focuses pn the internal Indonesian financial system, which has been accused of 
being a primary contributor to the financial crisis because its unsound banking systems 
caused inefficient investment spending and instability. 
At least three substantial causes triggered Indonesia’s unsound banking system: 
0 The weaknesses of the Indonesian Central Bank in managing monetary policy 
A package of laws regulating banking reform in 1988 
The exchange rate and foreign capital policy 
Each of these contributed significantly to the monetary and currency crisis in 
Indonesia. Yet, there was another factor contributing to the financial crisis in Indonesia: 
political instability, which directly impacted financial stability, causing a huge capital 
outflow in the face of inconsistent government policies. This factor is not discussed in 
depth as it transcends the scope of the thesis. However, let us examine each of the 
principal causes of the crisis as listed above. 
A. THE WEAKNESSES OF THE CENTRAL BANK IN MANAGING 
MONETARY POLICY 
Banking soundness is an essential condition for effective monetary policy, which 
is part of macroeconomic policy. “A well-managed macroeconomic policy, including a 
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good monetary policy to achieve monetary stability, cannot be sustained without a sound 
banking system.”(Djiwandono, 1998, p.5) Despite the continued competition from other 
financial intermediaries due to the globalization process, the banking sector in a national 
economy still plays a dominant role, particularly in a developing country like Indonesia. 
The conditions of the banking system reflect the status of the financial sector as a whole. 
Particularly the role of the central bank in managing the monetary sector and supervising 
banks. The central bank’s common duties include: 
Conducting the nation’s monetary policy by influencing the money and 
credit conditions in the economy and by pursuing full employment and 
stable prices. 
Supervising and regulating banking institutions to ensure the safety and 
soundness of the nation’s banking and financial system and to protect the 
credit rights of consumers. 
Maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic 
risks that may arise in financial markets. 
Providing certain financial services to the government, to the public, to 
financial institutions, and to foreign official institutions, including playing 
a major role in operating the nation’s payments system. (Board of 
Governor of Federal System, 1994, p. 1) 
A country experiencing banking problems requires a major, expensive 
overhaul of its banking system in order to have a better banking system. Many 
domestic factors can be attributable to the primary banking problems. For 
Indonesia, the first concern was the troublesome role of the Central Bank in 
managing the nation’s monetary policy. 
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1. The BI’s Dubious Role in Managing Monetary Policy 
In conducting monetary policy, the central bank basically employs three major 
tools: 1) conducting open market operations, 2) establishing reserve requirements, and 3) 
setting the level of interest rates. Let’s examine each factor individually: 
a. Open Market Operations 
The Indonesian Central Bank announced that BI has actively used the open 
market policy to manage the monetary sector. The BI simply used the Certificate Bank 
Indonesia (SBIs) as a primary tool to adjust the current money supply. For example, by 
selling SBIs to banks or non-bank institutions, the BI reduced the money supply. On the 
other hand, when the BI needed to increase the money supply, the BI bought the SBIs 
outstanding. This means the BI increased the flow of money into banks and non-bank 
institutions. Thus, selling and buying SBIs was a primary tool for managing the money 
supply for a short-term period. (Oppusunggu, 1999,~. 39) 
An open market operation is conducted infrequently when the central bank 
Thus, the open market needs some adjustments in supplying money to industry. 
operation is stopped when the money supply in industry reaches equilibrium. That means 
selling or buying SBIs could be stopped at any given time. In contrast, the BI sold SBIs 
periodically. Apparently the BI has set a target volume in selling the SBIs monthly. In 
addition, the BI bought the SBIs outstanding when they matured instead of considering 
the money supply. Target-selling and SBIs redemption when mature are not considered 
open market operations. The reason for this is that the BI did not have a specific target 
for how much money is needed or how much money should be absorbed. It seemed that 
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the BI was trapped by a habitual, routine response. The BI’s misperception about the open 
market operation merely increased the vulnerability of the financial system. 
Bank closure was becoming the main disputable issue to the nation’s 
bankers. The BI agreed to close banks under the IMF’s prescriptions and thereby eroded 
the depositors’ trust in the banking system. Many of the largest private banks faced 
liquidity problems as the depositors withdrew their deposits. To reduce the liquidity 
problem, the BI launched a program named “Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support” (BLBI). 
BLBI was not a short-term loan but was actually real money used to substitute for 
deposits. But those banks, which received the BLBI, were not allowed to operate the 
BLBIs for any business purposes. Demand for the BLBI was growing rapidly from 
Rp.62.8 trillion in 1997 to Rp. 180 trillion in March 1998. The money in circulation in 
1997 was Rp. 356 trillion with the reserve requirement about Rp. 40 trillion, which grew 
to Rp.566 trillion in Jun 1998. (Oppusunggu, 1999, p.51) It is obvious that BI’s 
Liquidity Support Program ignored the role of an open market operation and contributed 
to the financial crisis. 
b. Reserve Requirements 
By definition “reserve requirement” entails the amount of funds that 
commercial banks and other depository institutions must hold in reserve against deposits. 
The central bank has the authority to set the level of the reserve requirement. Since banks 
can expand the supply of money, which is known as the money multiplier, the central 
bank can limit the money multiplier by increasing the reserve requirement. The reserve 
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requirement also has another function as stated in “Purpose & Function” written by the 
Board of Governor of Federal System, 1994: 
Reserve requirements continue to be important in the conduct of monetary 
policy, partly because they provide a stable, predictable demand for 
aggregate reserves. Without reserve requirements, banks would still hold 
some balances at the Central bank to meet their clearing needs. Thus, it 
can more readily achieve a desired degree of pressure on bank reserve 
positions by manipulating the supply of reserves.(Board of Governor, 
1994, p. 56) 
The BI control? and sets the reserve requirement. Reserve money, which 
consists of bank notes, coins circulating outside the BI, treasury notes held by commercial 
banks, and demand deposits of commercial banks, can be viewed as liabilities on the 
balance sheet of the Indonesian monetary authority. The assets consist of net foreign 
assets, net credit to government, net credit to commercial banks, net credit to public 
sectors, open market operation, and others. (Oppusunggu, 1999, p. 113) The BI policy 
on the reserve requirement was inconsistent and sometimes confused the banks. For 
example, banks were required to purchase SBIs from the BI in amounts equal to 80% of 
the reduction in their required reserves. The banks were permitted to hold up to one-half 
of their required reserves in vault cash and one-half in noninterest bearing deposits in BI 
accounts. Most banks had held excess reserves because they did not want to have a 
reserve deficiency. As a consequence, the liquidity preference of most banks increased, 
and they tended to hold reserves at a 5 6 %  level rather than 2% as required. (Ibid.,1999, 
p. 113) 
This policy was confusing and irrational for two reasons. First, by 
substituting the SBIs for the reserve requirement, the BI bore a higher cost of interest. 
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Second, banks were reluctant to’ reduce their reserve requirement, even if they tended to 
maintain a level 56%. To satisfy the requirement of buying SBIs most banks borrowed 
funds from offshore loans, which offered lower interest rates. As a result, not only 
monetization took place but also a large amount of money became passive instead of 
expanding credit nationwide. 
The liquidity support program was also confusing. On one hand, the 
government imposed the tight money policy, but on the other hand, the government 
injected a huge amount of cash into banks. Hadad (1999) comments: “Reserve money 
showed a substantial increase from Rp. 36.2 trillion at the end of 1997 to Rp. 70 trillion 
in June 1998, whereas, demand deposits at BI fell steeply as a result of liquidity scarcity 
in the banking sector.”(Hadad, 1999, p. ) The expansion of reserve money resulted 
mainly from an increase in BI’s claims to the banking industry. The increase claims 
stemmed from the increased liquidity support to banks that faced liquidity problems. 
Apparently the BI repeated the same mistake by ignoring the impacts of pouring a large 
amount of money into the banking system. 
C. 
The “discount rate” is the interest rate charged to commercial banks and 
other depository institutions when they borrow reserves from the Central Bank. The 
Indonesian central bank has been adopting the discount rate policy by requiring the 
issuance of promissory notes (SBPUs) by the fund borrower or banks. SBPUs cany a 
specific interest rate, which is approved by BI. When the SBPUs matured, SBPUs was 
returned to the borrower, and the borrower paid the exact amount of the SBPUs. 
The Diwount Rate or Interest Rate 
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To halt the contagion effects on the financial sectors in 1997, the BI was 
adopting a tight money policy with the intention of lessening the interest of people who 
speculate in the money market. The BI increased the SBIs’ interest rate and terminated 
the SBPUs. Consequently, banks faced liquidity problems because they had to pay a high 
interest rates to the BI, but were not making new loans, because potential borrowers were 
deterred by the high interest rates. For a short-term period the tight money policy was 
less risky, but it was high risk for longer periods. BI realized that the tight money policy 
was needed longer than it was predicted. The banks’ liquidity and insolvency problems 
were inevitable since nonperforming loans were also rising. 
2. BI Supervision and Law Enforcement 
The BI, as the central bank, has been given the right and obligation to supervise 
the banking system, including private and state banks and non-bank institutions, such as 
insurance companies and pension funds. Although supported by law, the BI was less than 
fully effective. “As the central bank, the BI was unable tu keep up with the rapid progress 
and increasing complexity of bank operations, yet on the other hand, banks were lured to 
overlook prudential principles governing their operations.” (Hadad, 1999, p.7) 
a. 
Bank Indonesia, as the central bank, has been given the authority to 
BI Supervision and Its Independence 
supervise and to take any actions in enforcing the regulation of the banking system. 
Unfortunately, the position of the’BI’s governor is the same level as a minister. That 
means the governor of the BI was under the control of president. The role of the central 
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bank in supervising banks by providing assistance, directions, warnings and sanctions is 
certainly required. The Bassle Committee (1999) confirmed: 
An important part of the supervisory process is the authority of the central 
bank to develop and to use prudential regulations and requirements to 
control these risks, including those covering capital adequacy, loan loss 
reserves, asset concentrations, liquidity, risk management and internal 
controls. This purpose is to limit imprudent risk-taking by banks. 
Minimum capital adequacy ratios are necessary to reduce the risk of loss to 
depositors, creditors and other stakeholders of the bank and to help the 
central bank pursue the overall stability of the banking industry. (Basle 
Committee, 1999, p. 22) 
In this case the BI has set the capital ratio requirement at 4% for the core assets and 8% 
for both core and supplemental assets in relation to risk weighted assets and market risks. 
When a bank has a ratio that falls below the minimum requirement, the BI should ensure 
that it has realistic plans to restore the minimum in a timely fashion. 
Unfortunately, the BI did not perform this supervision as stated above. 
The large number of the banks and lack of discipline among bankers to report on a timely 
basis to the BI were the main reason. As a result, the banking system became worse and 
worse because so many improper banking practices were allowed to happened. For 
example, banks were not complying with the required ratio of 8 % of capital risk 
weighted assets. To illustrate the general condition of the banking sector prior to the 
financial crisis in Indonesia: 
The position of seventeen banks, among them was the state bank Bapindo, 
were unclear, as they had not published a financial report in the past two to 
four years. There have been about 20 banking scandals since 1990 
involving outright fraud, with commercial paper, collusion and connected 
lending. Coupled with the fact that the BI has a hard time controlling the 
illegal behavior of banks, there have even been reports of BI’s officials’ 
involvement in some bank scandals. (Mann, 1998, p.18) 
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b. Weak Law Enforcement 
Although the BI has been given authority to enforce the laws, many 
bankers gave little attention to the BI warnings. They tended to ignore the existing 
regulations, such as a limit on lending to connected parties and unsecured loans due to 
inadequate collateral, etc. Soedrajat Djiwandono, a former governor of BI was quoted as 
saying, 
... My major problems were that the BI was not independent of the 
government and as a member of the cabinet, I was very much a junior 
minister. My power in supervising banks was largely only on persuasion 
and in Indonesia any objectives sought through persuasion alone are bound 
to fail. In other words, my ability to enforce the rules and regulations was 
strictly limited to the willingness of the bankers to obey. (Mann, 1998, 
P.18) 
For example, Liem Sioe Liong, who received support and protection from 
the Soeharto administration, owns Bank Central Asia (BCA), the largest private’ bank in 
Indonesia. When a run on the BCA occurred in 1997, as much as Rp. 20 trillion by 
massive depositors’ withdrawals, the BCA with 446 branch offices was still able to serve 
panicked customers due to liquidity support from the BI. This situation was possible 
because of the BCA shareholder’s intervention with the BI. Since, Soeharto’s children 
have substantial shares in this bank, it was understandable that the BI was reluctant to 
refuse their request. ( M a ,  1998, p.16) According to the Info-bank’s data report: 
At least four others banks are owned by the Soeharto family. Those banks 
are Bank Alfa, Bank Utama, Bank Duta, and Bank Yama. Except Bank 
Duta, their financial condition was in a shaky position. The Soeharto 
family’s abuse of banks, however, is not confined to those they controlled. 
State banks, even the central bank, were not immune from their 
intervention. To illustrate, Bank Dagang Negara (BDN) and Bank Bumi 
Daya (BBD) were forced into releasing loans to projects undertaken by 
conglomerates of Soeharto’s children. (Mann, 1998, p.17) 
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c. The Lender of the Last Resort 
The central banks in developing countries usually act as the lender of last 
resort. There are two reasons for this: the government’s inherent interest in the banking 
system and the causal relationship between the central bank and all other banks. The 
government in a developing country like Indonesia must oversee banks as part of the 
nation’s payment system and regulate the banks’ ability to mobilize funds from various 
sources and to distribute those funds to private or government’s projects. Clearly, due to 
the national significance and uniqueness of the banks’ functions, the government 
definitely does not want banks to fail or undergo bankruptcy. 
The central bank and banks institutions are team members in the nation’s 
payment system. There is no question that if one of them malfunctioned, either the 
central bank or the banks, it would create financial instability. As a team, they have to 
work together; a failure on one side affects the other side and leads to financial instability. 
Considering this relationship, the central bank was forced to help the troubled banks. 
B. FINANCIAL REFORM DEREGULATION PACKAGE OF 1988 
In order to promote the development of the industry, mobilize domestic saving, 
and encourage competition among banks, the Ministry of Finance introduced a package of 
deregulation in October 1988, known as PAKTO 88. Before 1988, the industry was 
dominated by the seven state commercial banks, which provided over 60% of all credits 
outstanding. Four disputable issues were identified by the government and were taken 
into consideration: 
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0 Whether to open up the licensing of new commercial banks and branching of 
the existing banks. 
How to reduce the differential taxation of interest income on time and saving 
deposits from that on interest and dividend income on securities. 
0 Whether to eliminate the requirement that state owned enterprises must only 
have banking relationship with the state banks. 
0 Whether to permit participation of new foreign banks. 
1. Significant Key Provisions 
The package of deregulation contained three significant key provisions, which 
altered the banks’ community and required them to comply with these regulations 
promptly. 
a. Bank Entry Policy 
When the Indonesian government set the initial capital requirement for 
new domestic banks both negative and positive repercussion arose. Many groups wanted 
a higher capital requirement to limit applications for new licenses, while others wanted to 
encourage many new applications and therefore keep the capital requirement low. The 
final agreement was settled and affected three categories of banks. People’s credit banks 
were required an initial capital of Rp. 50 million. Private banks were required an initial 
capital of Rp. 10 billion, and joint venture banks were required an initial capital of Rp. 50 
billion. (Cole & Slade, 1996, p. 114) The foreign banks were permitted to establish joint 
venture banks, with 85% of their ownership. They were permitted to open their branch 
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offices in seven large cities outside Jakarta. The bankers responded happily because they 
believed that the easy approval and the low capital requirement for new banks would not 
last indefinitely . 
b. Reduction in Tax Differentials on Interest Income and Dividend 
In order to obtain greater revenues, the government was targeting taxation 
as the second largest source of the government’s income. This effort led the government 
to review the existing regulation on the taxation system. Prior to the establishment of the 
PAKTO 88, interest and dividends were not subject to tax. Imposing taxes on these 
personal incomes would increase the tax collections. But this issue invited pros and cons. 
Finally, reduction of the differential in the tax treatment of bank deposits and other 
securities resulted in an agreement that a tax should be imposed on time deposit interest. 
Cole & Slade (1996, p. 1 1) illustrated the situation above: 
The concern about higher loan rates was that they could discourage 
investment and increase producers’ cost. On the other side, lowering 
deposit rates could lead to capital outflow. One way to offset a tax on 
deposit interest income would be to lower the reserve requirement, which 
earned no interest and was criticized as a kind of implicit tax on banks that 
was passed on in the forms of both higher interest rates and lower rates on 
deposits. The existing reserve requirement was 15%. 
Offsetting the implicit tax led to the decision to reduce the reserve requirement to a 
uniform level of 2% of all third-party liabilities. 
c. Eliminating the “Bound” Relationship between State Banks and 
Enterprises 
Permitting state enterprises to move some of their banking business out of 
the state banks was seen as a means of promoting competition and weakening outside 
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interference in bank decisions. Eliminating the required relationship between state 
enterprises and state banks encouraged the state enterprises to shift their deposits to and 
to apply for loans from private commercial banks for their projects. This shift from state 
banks to private banks occurred because private banks offered easier procedures and were 
more efficient in doing business. Soon, the state banks realized that smaller profits could 
be earned due to a large amount of capital outflow and significant contraction in their 
credit loans and liquidity problems resulted. This in turn forced these banks to begin 
improper lending practices. 
In conjunction with the promotion of bank competitiveness, the Ministry 
of Finance imposed a limitation on loans to individuals or to affiliated groups to reduce 
risks and to prevent big depositors from influencing bank decisions. “The lending limit 
was set at 20% of capital to a single borrower and 50% of capital to a group of borrowers, 
and for the state’s enterprises were permitted to hold up to 50% of their deposits in state’s 
banks, but no more than 20% in private banks.” (Cole & Slade, 1996, p. 112) 
2. 
The package of deregulation of October 1988 was known as the Financial 
Liberalization Reforms. These reforms made it easier to establish both domestic and 
foreign banks. It also made it easier for existing domestic and foreign banks to add 
branches, and it also allowed private banks to compete fairly for the deposits and loans of 
the state owned enterprises. 
The Impact of PAKTO 88 
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a. Introducing Secondary Money Market Vs Monetization 
By publishing PAKTO ’88, banks were forced to buy SBIs. Seemingly BI 
was trying to use this policy to develop a secondary money market for debt instruments. 
To promote SBIs, the BI conducted several meetings with the nation’s bankers to 
emphasize that SBIs were tradable among banks. 
outstanding to mature without requiring them to be rolled over. 
Moreover, BI allowed all SBIs 
Substituting the amounts of the reduction in reserve requirement into the 
form of SBIs created a liquidity squeeze. Thereby, the I31 reduced the money supply 
significantly and immediately. In addition, most banks were uninformed prior to the 
publication of PAKTO 88, so they were surprised and were limited by time to provide 
funds to buy SBIs. Many banks repatriated their funds, especially from Singaporean 
banks, and others sought offshore borrowings, which lower interest costs. Banks viewed 
the latter favorably. Thereafter, offshore loans became a major method of funding, not 
only to buy SBIs, but also as fund resources when they were converted into domestic 
currency. Unfortunately, the BI allowed this activity by facilitating the swap exchange, 
which allowed banks, to exchange foreign currency into domestic currency, mostly for 
U.S. dollars. This process is called “monetization,” which added to the fragility of 
financial stability. 
b. Expansion of Credits and Loans 
Since PAKTO ’88 eased the standard for the licensing of new banks, it 
resulted in a large number of new banks being licensed in the following years. The 
number of commercial banks doubled, rising from 124 banks in October 1988 to 240 
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banks in 1994, and the banking network also increased from 1,800 offices to more than 
7,000 offices nationwide. Obviously, the growing number of new banks contributed to 
high competition among banks. “The growth rate of both deposits and loans increased 
dramatically at a rate of approximately 80% a year for the period December 1988 to 
December 1990, compared to the previous years.” (Cole & Slade, 1996, p. 115) 
The large amounts of offshore borrowings that were converted into 
domestic currency merely halted the reduction in money supply. Foreign investors 
thought that making investments in Indonesia was favorable since Indonesia offered 
higher interest rates. In addition, all SBIs outstanding, which were sold forcedly in 1988, 
matured and did not require a rollover. These factors contributed to an unanticipated 
increase in the money supply. This increase quickly encouraged higher consumption and 
maximized the banks’ credits and loan. 
c. Unsustuinable High Economic Growth 
This aggressive competition among banks caused high expansions both in 
credits and loans, which probably contributed to accelerating the overall economic growth 
without adversely affecting the relative price stability and the balance of payments 
equilibrium. After PAKTO 88, the Indonesian economic performances improved rapidly. 
For example, “the real rate of economic growth rose from 6% in 1988 to 7.5% in 1989, 
and the inflation rate declined from 8.1% in 1988 to 6.0% in 1989, while the net foreign 
exchange reserve increased modestly.” (Cole & Slade, 1996, p. 115) 
But these improved performances were unsustained. In early 1990, 
economic growth overheated as a result of an unanticipated high increase in the money 
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supply. Offshore borrowing that was then converted to BI increased the foreign exchange 
liabilities as much as $ 8.7 billion in 1990. In addition, SBIs redemption added to the 
money supply as much as $ 1.3 billion. Moreover, the reduction of the reserve 
requirement to 2 % also increased the money supply. In turn, rising high inflation and 
deficits in the balance of payments threatening financial stability. 
C. THE EXCHANGE RATE & FOREIGN CAPITAL POLICY 
The Indonesian economic experts, who were mostly educated in western countries 
such as in the US. and in the European countries, proposed an open economy policy to 
the government. They believed that by opening trade with the world, they would enjoy 
cheaper prices and a larger volume of goods than a country which adopted a closed 
economy policy. To export and to import goods and merchandise, a currency exchange 
agreement is needed because the currency is different. 
“In April 1970, the Indonesian government decided to implement a fully 
convertible foreign exchange system, with a unified fixed exchange rate, no significant 
restrictions on capital outflows and only minor limitations on capital inflows.” (Cole & 
Slade, 1996, p.43) This decision was urged by IMF to terminate the multiple exchange 
systems, which had been used since 1966. In addition, the Minister of Trade, Professor 
Soemitro, and the Minister of Finance, Professor Wardhana, preferred a fixed rate system 
that would help control inflationary pressure and instability, and also eliminate foreign 
exchange controls and allocation systems to minimize corruption. The new exchange 
rate policies adopted in April 1970 consisted of: 
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Unifying the exchange rate at the prevailing free market of Rp. 378 per 
US dollar. 
Fixing the rate for an indefinite period and absorbing any foreign 
exchange surpluses or meet any deficits by purchases and sales of 
foreign exchange by the BI. 
Closing the Foreign Exchange Transaction Board and abolishing the 
old regulations for allocation of foreign exchange. (Cole & Slade, 
1996, p. 43) 
The Indonesian government chose a fixed exchange rate regime, for two reasons: To 
reduce transaction costs and exchange rate risks, which discourage trade and investment; 
and to provide a credible nominal anchor for monetary policy. For example, by fixing the 
exchange rate the central bank could commit more credibly to fighting inflation, because 
the currency peg would prevent the central bank from expanding even if it wanted to. 
1. Balance of Payments and Foreign Exchange Reserve 
a. Current Account Denits 
The current account is a common measure of international payments, 
which is more comprehensive &an net exports, and includes net interest payments on 
foreign borrowings and lending and miscellaneous transfers between countries. It not 
only measures the flow of cash arising from trade and transfers, but also measures 
indirectly the economy’s international financing requirements. Data on the current 
account positions provide some preliminary evidence that the currency crisis may have 
been associated with an external competitiveness problem. Mishra (1980) appraised the 
Indonesian government effort: 
In the 1980s, the balance of payments situation was managed by 
restraining import, which was achieved primarily through the introduction 
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of non-tariff barriers such as the devaluation of the Rupiah that induced a 
switch in demand from imports to domestic substitutes. The current 
account deficits fell from 7.9% of GNP in 1982 to 4.0% of GNP in 1990. 
The specific measures that helped restore balance of payment stability 
included: depreciation of the real exchange rate; re-phasing of large capital 
and import intensive projects and cutback in real public expenditures; tight 
monetary policy; trade and regulatory reforms which stimulated non-oil 
exports. (Mishra, 1980, p. 121) 
Indonesia started the 1990s with large current account deficits, as much as 
4.0% of GNP, but the deficit shrank in 1993, then widened again, reaching 3.0% of GNP 
in 1996. Financial variables that affect in an important way the sustainability of the large 
current account deficits consist of the composition and size of capital inflows, foreign 
exchange reserve and debt burden, fragility of financial system, and political instability. 
In the 199Os, the composition of capital inflow to Indonesia consisted 
mostly of short-term loans. Unfortunately, the private sector used short-term loans in a 
bigger proportion than the government. Unlike the government, the private sector 
invested most of the loans in long-term projects. When a large depreciation of the 
domestic currency occurred, the private sector experienced a huge loss. Radelet & Sach 
(1998) pointed out the problems of short-term loans: 
The composition of the capital inflows necessary to finance a given current 
account deficit is an important determinant of sustainability. Short-term 
capital inflows are more dangerous than long-term flows and equity 
inflows are more stable than debt-creating inflows. A current account 
deficit that is financed by large foreign direct investment is more 
sustainable than a deficit financed by short-term "hot money" flows that 
may reversed if market conditions and sentiments change. However, 
Indonesia has experienced a large stock of short-term loans from foreign 
banks, which may lead to a debt crisis if a panic ensuing a currency crisis 
leads foreign bank to refuse to rollover the loans that come to maturity. 
The currency composition of the foreign liabilities of the country matters 
as well. While foreign currency debt may lead to greater capital inflows at 
a lower interest rate than borrowing in domestic currency, foreign currency 
42 
debt may end up exacerbating an exchange rate crisis as a real depreciation 
leads to an increase in the real burden of foreign debt. (Radelet & Sach, 
1998, p.7) 
This is exactly what happened in Indonesia in late 1997, when the currency crisis turned 
into a debt crisis as the depreciation of the currencies led to a rapid and dramatic increase 
in the domestic currency burden of foreign-currency denominated debt. 
b. Foreign Exchange Reserves 
The existence of large foreign exchange reserves facilitates the financing 
of a current account deficit and enhances the credibility of a fixed exchange rate policy. 
Foreign exchange reserves and a small external debt burden reduce the risk of external 
crisis and enable financing a current account deficit at lower costs. The real rate paid on 
the country's debt is an indication of the market's evaluation of the country's ability to 
sustain a current account deficit. 
When a country exports goods and services, it increases the amount of the 
foreign reserves, whereas, imported goods and services reduced the foreign reserves. 
Since imports reduce the foreign reserves, that implies that foreign reserves are vital to 
the country to pay for its consumption from abroad. Foreign reserves serve as a measure 
of ability to import goods and services. Roubini (1998) explained further about the 
measurement of foreign reserve: 
A traditional measure of the adequacy of foreign exchange reserves is the 
stock of reserves in months of imports of goods and services. As rapid 
outflows of speculative money have become a more important source of 
foreign exchange pressure than trade imbalances, the traditional measure is 
no longer used. A better measure of the adequacy is the ratio of money 
assets to foreign reserves, since in the event of an exchange crisis, all 
liquid money assets can potentially be converted into foreign exchange. 
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The ratio of M2 to foreign reserves constantly rose throughout the 1990 
and reached a peak as high as 7.09% in 1995, and the ratio of M1 to 
foreign reserves was about 1.21%. (Roubini, 1998, p. 35) 
The ratio of total short-term external liabilities to foreign reserves at the end of 1996 was 
181%. This means, in the event of a liquidity crisis, foreign banks were no longer willing 
to roll over short-term loans in Indonesia. 
The fixed exchange rate leads over time to real appreciation and a 
As the real appreciation becomes worse and the worsening current account deficit. 
current account keeps on worsening, more and more foreign capital inflows are needed to 
finance the current account deficit. When investors start to realize that the fixed rate is 
not sustainable they start to believe that devaluation might occur. This expected 
depreciation leads to an increase in the expected return on foreign assets and, for given 
domestic interest rates, leads to capital outflows. Then the domestic foreign reserves of 
the central bank start to fall as it intervenes in the exchange rate market to defend its 
currency from depreciating. As the expected depreciation materializes, the loss of foreign 
reserves occurs at an even faster rate as capital outflows. It happened during the third 
quarter of 1997, and the BI had widened the band from 8% to 12%, but it did not work. 
The BI recognized the loss of some of its foreign reserves, and decided to move to a 
flexible exchange rate. The speculative attack on domestic currency lead to a sharp and 
large devaluation of the exchange rate. By early 1998 the value of the Rupiah fell to the 





2. Foreign Capital Policy 
A country which applied the open economy policy would likely be better off, but 
greater openness also makes it more vulnerable in terms of trade shocks and uncontrolled 
capital outflows. Indonesia in the 1980s initiated a series of reforms streamlining 
investment approval procedures and reduced licensing and other controls on domestic and 
foreign investment. “One of the major aims of the structural adjustment programs was to 
move the economy from an inward oriented and oil dependent growth path to a country 
which was more outward oriented and based on more diversified productions.” (Mishra, 
1980, p.122) 
Those policies created an environment conducive to business transactions, 
inducing a sharp increase in both domestic and foreign investment. “Domestic 
investment rose by 134% in 1987, a further 45% in 1988, and doubled in value in 1991, 
similarly the foreign investment rose by 76% in 1987, a remarkable 300% in 1988 with 
value of $4.4 billion, and increased to $ 8.75 billion in 1990.” (Mishra, 1980, p.112) As 
a consequence, the external debt was also rising because of falling oil prices in the 1980s 
and increased reliance on external assistance, which a total from $ 13.4 billion in 1980 to 
$44.3 billion in 1990. 
Increasing gross external liabilities became a serious issue in 1997, because once 
the currency crisis started, large gross capital outflows exacerbated the crisis in two ways. 
First, as the currency fell, non-residents were repatriating the capital inflows by dumping 
domestic bonds, equities and other financial assets; and residents, who had accumulated 
large stocks of financial capital, were unwilling to repatriate such foreign currency 
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outflows as their domestic currency was falling. Second a large fraction of the gross 
capital outflows were in the banking sector. This process of large gross intermediation of 
capital inflows and outflows through the banking system implied that the domestic banks 
were increasing their foreign short-term liabilities much faster than their foreign assets. 
(Roubini, 1998, p. 29) 
“Under the fixed exchange rates and perfect capital mobility, the central bank has 
no control over the money supply, therefore, it has no monetary autonomy since the 
central bank has less power to set the money supply and the domestic interest rate.” 
(Roubini, 1998, p.19) To defend stability of the currency, the central bank intervenes in 
the market by selling foreign reserves. In turn, this intervention reduces the money 
supply and increases the domestic interest rate up to the new higher world interest rate. At 
this point, the loss of foreign reserves stops. Any attempts to intervene in the market 
through an open market operation will lead to an equal and offsetting loss of foreign 
exchange reserves with no overall effects. 
D. SUMMARY 
The root of the internal causes of the financial crisis in Indonesia involved three 
broad areas: the weaknesses of the Bank Indonesia as the central bank, the negative 
effects of the banking reforms in 1988, known as PAKTO 88, and the dubious exchange 
rate and capital policy. 
The BI, as the central bank, was supposed to supervise banks, to enforce the laws, 
and to punish banks that violated any rules. But the BI did not carry out those duties 
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properly. In addition, the BI was seen as incapable of conducting its duties, especially 
regarding monetary policy. Misperception in performing its tasks in regulating the 
monetary sector weakened the financial stability. Either external intervention or 
inadequate internal control made the BI's performance poor. 
In many developing countries, government involvement to promote and to boost 
economic growth were properly needed. By issuing regulatory policies, the government 
provided certain guidelines to the public on how to engage and participate in business. 
When the government issued a policy with inadequate considerations, it might lead to 
negative outcomes. For example, a package of laws regulating banking reform in 1988 
was beneficial in the short-term, but harmful in the long-term. 
The exchange rate and capital policy also contributed to the financial crisis in 
Indonesia. Free exchange flows inspired banks and the private sector to borrow offshore 
loans with no obligation to report to the BI. Unfortunately, both bankers and the private 
sectors perceived that offshore loans were more favorable than domestic loans. 
Eventually, offshore loans grew dramatically and were not under the BI's control. When 
the financial crisis happened both bankers and the private sector panicked easily. The 
next chapter will explain the government's efforts to overcome and to resolve the 
financial crisis in the banking sector. 
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IV. THE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO OVERCOME THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS IN INDONESIA 
This chapter will explain the government efforts to overcome and to recover from 
the Asian financial crisis, which nearly collapsed the banking system. Many policies 
have been applied and implemented simultaneously by the government in order to solve 
and to recover from the crisis. Basically, the Indonesian government has attempted to 
implement two major strategic programs for the banking sector: 
Recapitalizing and restructuring the banking system. 
Reviewing the government’s regulation of the banking system. 
A. RECAPITALIZING AND RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING 
PROGRAMS 
The Government issued Presidential Decree of the Republic of Indonesia No. 27 
of 1998 and Regulations of the Government of the Republic of Indonesian No. 17 of 1999 
to establish the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (BRA). To accomplish the 
mission, the BRA has developed a systematic, consistent and comprehensive 
restructuring strategy, which consists of three programs: 
1. Commercial Banks Liabilities Guarantee Program 
2. Bank Restructuring and Recapitalizing 
3. Sale of Assets and Recovery of State Funds 
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1. Commercial Banks Liabilities Guarantee Program 
In order to restore public confidence and to restore the banking sector, the 
government has issued a policy of guaranteeing the liabilities of commercial banks. “This 
program was designed to have a minimal impact on the government budget and the 
balance of payments.” (BPPN, 1999, p.12) In addition, the BRA has strived to extend 
the maturity dates of commercial bank liabilities of both foreign creditors and domestic 
creditors through participation in the exchange offer. 
a. Cooperation with Bank Indonesia 
Through joint cooperation with the BI, the BRA would implement the 
programs. Due to difficulties in obtaining data for verification purposes, BI’s cooperation 
and outsourcing of collection assets held abroad to third party consultants were needed. 
Outsourcing would accelerate the process and reduce costs because they work 
professionally and efficiently. 
b. Limitation on the Types of Liabilities Guaranteed 
In order to prevent massive withdrawal and to restore public confidence, 
the government launched a bank’s liabilities program. Under this program, depositors 
were guaranteed that their money was safe, although the banks that held their money were 
closed. To implement the guarantee program, the government appointed the seven state 
banks to provide cash in the case of withdrawal. To prevent cash flowing out of the 
government’s pocket without sufficient documents and approval, the government issued a 
list, which contained excluded items from the guaranteed program. The IBRA 
acknowledged this program as written in the “Rencana Strategisl999-2OO4 ”: 
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All commercial bank liabilities are guaranteed under this program, 
except the following: 
Equity loan and subordinated loans 
Liabilities which cannot be verified and liabilities arising from 
irregular banking practices 
Liabilities to the board of directorshoard of commissioners and related 
parties 
Liabilities in respect of checking accounts, savings accounts, term 
deposits, on call deposits, and other securities which carry above- 
market interest rates 
Claims, which are not accompanied by valid documents within 60 days 
of the maturity date. The government charges a premium to program 
participants to offset the impact of the program’s cost to the 
government budget. (BPPN, 1999, p.12) 
c. Exchange Offer 
Providing funds to support this program without altering the budget was 
the primary concern. Finally, to minimize pressure on the state budget and the balance of 
payments, the government established an exchange offer, designed to extend the maturity 
dates of the claims of foreign creditors on Indonesian banks. 
2. Bank Restructuring and Recapitalizing 
The Indonesian government would not receive the IMF’s loans to support 
recovery programs unless the government made serious efforts to revive the banking 
system. As a response to the IMF prerequisite, the government established the bank 
restructurization and recapitalization program. 
The purpose of the program was to create a healthy banking system, characterized 
by globally competitive banks that meet international standards and have good 
management and adequate risk management. Banks with good performing assets would 
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be capable of meeting their own liabilities without involving the government. 
Nevertheless, many banks would still be unable to meet all of their liabilities and 
therefore, the government would be responsible for those liabilities. The process of the 
recapitalization program was illustrated in the “Rencana Strategisl999-2004 ”: 
The recapitalization program began with an appraisal of the financial 
position of each bank in accordance with the international standards. 
Independent accountants of international standard conducted this 
appraisal. 
Banks with Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of above 4% are classified 
as Category A banks and are permitted to continue operating without 
government interference. 
Banks with a CAR of between 4% and negative 25% are classified as 
Category B Banks, and subsequently either taken over or placed in the 
bank recapitalization program. 
Banks with a CAR of under negative 25% are classified as Category C 
Banks and are frozen, except if their owners fund a recapitalization to 
a minimum of a 4% CAR. 
After the financial audit, the selection process continues with an 
appraisal of commercial prospects, paying special attention to 
franchise value. (BPPN, 1999, p. 19) 
In addition to commercial prospects, an evaluation was conducted of the competence and 
integrity of management and controlling shareholders. All of the above appraisals are 
conducted jointly by Bank Indonesia, the BRA and the Department of Finance, under the 
supervision of the IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank. After intensive 
evaluation, the government created the following four categories to deal with the 128 
private domestic banks: 
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a. Bank Which Could Continue Operation Without 
Recapitalization 
There were 74 banks in Category A, with a CAR 4% or more. It was 
determined that these banks met Bank Indonesia's minimum capital adequacy 
requirement and could operate without financial assistance from the government. Capital 
injections by the bank owners have been verified and approved by the Evaluation 
Committee (Bank Indonesia, Ministry of Finance, and Indonesian Bank Restructuring 
Agency). These banks would continue to be monitored closely to ensure they remained in 
good financial health and continued to observe the regulations. (BPPN, 1999, p. A-15) 
b. Nine Banks Were Eligible for the Recapitalization Program 
It was determined that nine banks were eligible for the bank 
recapitalization program: Bank International Indonesia, Bank Lippo, Bank Bali, Bank 
Niaga, Bank Universal, Bank Bukopin, Bank Patriot, Bank Artha Media, and Bank Prima 
Express. On April 15", 1999, recapitalization agreements were signed between those 
banks and the government represented by BRA. The controlling shareholders of the nine 
recapitalization participant banks agreed to fund their 20% of the recapitalization 
requirements by placing cash into escrow accounts not later than by April 22nd, 1999. 
(BPPN, 1999, p. A-15) 
c. Thirteen Banks Were Taken Over by the Government 
The Government took over thirteen banks in Category B which had a large 
number of customers and a widespread branch network. The decision to take over these 
banks was based on consideration of public interest to prevent disrupting the payment 
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system. Banks, which were taken over are still open to serve clients. With the take over, 
the banks were 100% owned by the government and the bank owners no longer had any 
authority over the banks. The Government assessed the management of the banks and 
made changes if necessary. (BPPN, 1999, p. A-15) The old owners were required to repay 
their debts to the banks, in accordance with the set precedents. How to treat the taken 
over banks was explained in the “Rencana Strategisl999-2004”: 
The resolution and recapitalization of BTOs (bank taken over) are 
carried out based upon the joint decision of the Minister of Finance 
and the Governor of the BI. 
Taking Over Management. The IBRA plays an active role in the 
management of BTOs through placing BRA managers in each BTO. 
Shareholder Settlements. The BRA coordinates shareholder 
settlements whereby former shareholders are requested to pay all of 
their groups’ liabilities. 
Resolution. The BRA recapitalizes designated BTOs by means of 
temporary capital participation. (BPPN, 1999, p.23) 
Thirteen banks have been taken over and classified into three groups by 
the BRA. The first group consists of four banks that were taken over by the BRA in 
1998. These banks include BCA, Bank Tiara Asia, Bank Danamon and Bank PDFCI. The 
second group consists of seven banks, Bank Duta, Bank Nusa Nasional, Bank Pos, Bank 
Jaya, Bank Tamara, Bank Rama and Bank Risjad Salim Internasional. This group would 
not be recapitalized as autonomous banks and would be merged with other BTOs. The 
third group consists of Bank Niaga and Bank Bali. These banks were previously included 
in the recapitalization program, but their status was changed, as their shareholders did not 
participate in the recapitalization process. (BPPN, 1999, p. A-15) 
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d. Forty-eight Banks Were Closed 
The government has closed 48 private domestic banks, consisting of 10 
banks in Category B and 38 banks in Category C. Bank closure was considered only 
when the banks were deeply insolvent and had no prospect of regaining financial 
viability. The old owners were required to repay their debts. The owners of deposits, 
savings and other accounts at the closed banks were fully guaranteed by the government. 
These banks were treated similarly by the IBRA: 
In the case of banks whose operations have been frozen, the IBRA has 
carried out the following actions: 
0 Payment of Bank Liabilities. In accordance with the government’s 
guarantee program, the BRA would pay all the eligible liabilities of 
the frozen banks. 
0 Transfer of Bank Assets. All the assets of frozen banks were 
transferred to the BRA. 
Liquidation. In the final stages, the IBRA would assist Bank 
Indonesia in liquidating the frozen banks to avoid any subsequent 
claims against the BRA. (BPPN, 1999, p.25) 
e. Improving Bank Management 
Inadequate knowledge on the parts of the banks’ managers was one of the 
internal factors that caused the Indonesia financial crisis. To promote banking soundness, 
the government focused serious attention on how to improve the managers skills. Since 
then, a series of programs has been designed to improve the quality of bank management. 
These programs encompass contract management, technical assistance, and the 
establishment of adequate incentive programs for both management and staff. The 
program is designed to correct the deficiencies in the existing reporting system and to 
improve the level of compliance with the BI regulations. Through this program the 
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number of banks in Indonesia would be dramatically reduced and the remaining banks 
would be healthier. A number of regional banks and some smaller banks would continue 
to serve their respective regions. (BPPN, 1999, p. 14) 
3. Sale of Assets and Recovery of State Funds 
The sale of assets and the recovery of the state funds are the most critical event. To 
complete the BRA’S mission the government has funded as much as Rp. 634 trillion. 
This cost was about 71 % relative to the GDP, and it was more than twice the cost of the 
recapitalization-banking sector in other Southeast Asian countries. (BPPN, 1999, p.49) In 
undertaking asset divestment, the BRA used some methods to maximize their sales 
value: 
Sale of company shares to strategic investors 
Initial Public Offerings 
Loan and financial asset sales 
0 Monetizing assets through securitizations 
a. 
The BRA would employ the selling methods that fit the market 
Sale of Shares to Strategic Investors 
conditions, the prospective investors, and the size of the company. If there is only one 
party who shows keen and certain interest (particularly shareholders or joint venture 
partners of the company), that party has preemptive rights. The public offering process 
will be preceded by an “exclusive offer period for the preferred bidder.” By employing 




bid, while at the same time allowing the BRA to invite other competitive bidders. 
(BPPN, 1999, p.33) 
b. Initiul Public Offering 
There were various methods of selling assets, but the BRA was aware that 
selling assets without careful considerations would lead to a lower price. The market 
demand for those assets was stable either from domestic investors or foreign investors. 
The BRA did not sell the assets partially or as a whole immediately because they wished 
to avoid a cheaper price below the BRA'S standard. 
To prevent selling assets below standard prices, the BRA collected data 
about the potential buyers, including nonbank financial institutions and especially the 
parties who previously owned the assets. They were contacted and given a priority to 
purchase the assets. The main reasons for using the initial public offering were described 
in the following sentences: 
One of the benefits of this method includes the facilitation of capital 
inflows through widespread ownership while maintaining existing 
management. The prospective equity investors, such as fund managers, 
pension funds, retail and small-scale investors, become potential buyers. 
The sale of shares to retail and small-scale investors will assist the 
government in its efforts to expand the public ownership of domestic 
companies. (BPPN, 1999, p. 35) 
c. Sale of Loan Assets 
The BRA'S divestment strategy was as follows: 
i 
0 The sale of loan portfolios would be carried out after the BRA had 
successfully concluded the restructuring process. 
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The sale of portfolios of small and medium-scale corporate loans and retail 
loans would be conducted as soon as possible. 
The sale of other bank assets, such as property and other financial 
investments, would be carried out by category and depend on the market 
demand. (BPPN, 1999, p.35) 
The BRA would approach interested investors or hold a public tender. 
The choice depended upon the type of asset and investor interest. The IBRA would use 
various structures in forming financial asset portfolios to maximize the value of the 
assets. The structures that may be employed include receivables-backed securities, 
collateral financing, or other structure which the IBRA has carefully considered. 
d. Monetizing Assets through Securitization 
The securitization of corporate earnings is another method. That is, the 
issuing company guarantees the issuance of various -types of debt instruments. The IBRA 
could propose to selected corporations to issue corporate bonds or promissory notes with 
specific assets provided by the BRA as collateral. The BRA securitization approach: 
In addition, the possibility of issuing convertible bonds, whereby upon 
maturity the investor is given the option of choosing between receiving 
cash or a number of shares in a selected company, needs to be explored. 
The choice of the best companies to issue such instruments will be based 
upon the quality of their revenue and cash flow. The best candidates are 
export-orientated companies, which have long-term contracts with 
reputable multi-national companies, with good growth potential. (BPPN, 
1999, p.36) 
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B. REVIEW THE GOVERNMENT’S REGULATIONS ON THE BANKING 
SYSTEM 
In order to speed up the recovery of the banking system, the government has 
reviewed the existing regulations of the banking system and has taken steps to improve 
them. To illustrate, the government enacted the Act number 10 of 1998 dealing with the 
banking system, as a substitute for the Act number 7 of 1992. In addition, the Act 
number 23 of 1999 on the central bank or Bank Indonesia was established to replace the 
Act number 13 of 1968. The government also issued the Act number 24 of 1999, 
dealing with the foreign exchange flow and exchange rate system as a response to the 
financial crisis. 
1. Establishing the Act No. 10 of 1998 on the Banking System 
This act was established merely as a result of modifying the Act number 7 of 
The content was based on the Act number 7 of 1992 and some additional 1992. 
materials. Significant new materials in this Act includes: 
Opening branches permission 
Banks’ obligations to maintain wealth 
Public accountant examination 
a. Branching Permission 
According to the Act no. 7 of 1992, banks must get the Minister of Finance’s 
approval to open branch offices. As a result, most bankers were reluctant to report to the 
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BI about their branch offices. Eventually, the BI was no longer informed of the actual 
status of banks and this created obstacles in supervising and controlling them. 
The Act no. 10 of 1998 was made as a response to this uncomfortable situation. The BI 
was given the authority to approve branch offices of the banks. In this way the BI was 
able to maintain and to supervise the banks. 
b. Banks' Obligations to Maintain Wealth 
Under the Act no. 7 of 1992, banks were required to maintain their wealth 
with respect to quality of assets, quality of management, liquidity, and solvency. Banks 
were also required to report their activities to the BI. As discussed earlier, most bankers 
tended to ignore or were simply incapable of following the regulation stated above. In 
addition, bankers or bank owners criticized the BI since the BI's instructions for reporting 
this information were unclear. Moreover, the BI's former governor stated that those bank 
managers were part of the problem because they lacked knowledge. As a result, the 
bankers were reluctant to submit their activities report to the BI. This reduced the BI's 
ability to supervise banks and, thus, made the banks' condition even worse. 
, 
To respond to the above situation, the government, through the Act no.10 
of 1998, improved the existing regulation by adding some mandates. Banks are still 
required to maintain their wealth, but if banks failed to maintain their wealth and 
threatened the nation's economy, the government can establish a special entity 
temporarily to revive those banks. The objectives are to accommodate the government 
effort in reviving the banks and to prevent lawsuits by bankers or bank owners. In fact, 
these objectives inspired the government to establish the BRA. 
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c. Examination by Public Accountant 
The Act no. 10 of 1998 allows a public accountant to perform due 
diligence over the banks. Indeed, before submitting their activity report, banks are 
required to obtain a public accountant’s certificate of examination. This issue was not 
addressed in the Act no.7 of 1992. 
Apparently the government realized that the BI’s duties were overloaded. 
Reducing the BI’s burden by involving a public accountant guarantees that banks are 
complying with the regulations. Under this act, the BI is still the main supervisor over 
the banks. But, the BI is allowed to appoint a public accountant in the name of the BI to 
perform due diligence over the banks. 
2. Establishing the Act No 23. of 1999; Bank Indonesia 
The Indonesian government is also improving the regulations of the central bank. 
In this case, the BI, as the central bank, was seen as being incapable of performing its 
duties because of external intervention, including that by the government. The Act no. 23 
of 1998 was intended to protect the BI from external pressures. This act has three 
significant features that came about as a result of modifying the previous act no. 13 of 
1968. 
0 Authority to open and to close bank. 
0 The BI’s governor and his rights. 
0 Transparency to the public. 
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a. Opening and Closing Authority 
Prior to the financial crisis, the BI was powerless in conducting law 
enforcement. Two reasons explain this condition. First, the Act no. 13 of 1968 provided 
the BI inadequate power to control banks. Bankers and bank owners felt secure even 
when they broke the BI’s regulations. They believed that BI’s sanctions were negotiable 
because they enjoyed a close relationship with the top level of the government. Second, 
the BI was overloaded with duties; and the number of the banks was so large, that the BI 
was unable to supervise each bank closely. As a result, the BI supervised poorly. 
By establishing the Act no. 23 of 1998, the BI is given authority to close a 
bank that seriously violates any regulation. When a bank’s operation is closed, all the 
employees are laid off and the banker and the bank owner is responsible for them. The 
banker and the bank owner can either pay three months salary or transfer them to other 
banks with equivalent jobs. It is obvious that such a closure is the bank’s biggest risk. So 
banks no longer perceive that the BI is powerless and its regulations negotiable. 
The Bl’s Governor and His Rights b. 
During President Abdurahman Wahid’s administration, the government 
has tried to promote a government free of corruption and nepotism. To assure the central 
bank‘s independence, the government is rewriting the existing laws controlling the central 
bank. As a result, the governor of the BI has been given more authority to resist external 
intervention. 
Under the Act no. 23 of 1998, the president appoints the governor and a 
senior deputy to the BI with the House of Representatives approval. Under the old act, the 
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president can appoint or replace the governor of the BI without the House of 
Representative’s approval. In addition, the appointed governor holds the job for four 
years. During this term, the president cannot replace the governor of the BI. In contrast, 
according to the Act no. 13 of 1968, the president was able to frre the governor of the BI at 
any time. Moreover, now the governor of the BI is immune from a court trial as long as 
he performs his duties appropriately. There is no question that the government has been 
promoting the independence of the BI. 
c. Transparency to the public 
Unlike the Act no. 13 of 1968, the new act, number 23, requires the BI to 
announce its monetary evaluation, its financial condition and other activities to the public 
periodically. The BI is also required to submit a formal report both to the president and 
to the House of Representatives. In addition, the Indonesian Supreme Audit Board and 
public accountants can examine the BI. Basically, these policies are intended to restore 
the public’s confidence in the banking sector. 
3. Establishing the Act no. 24 of 1999 
The Act no. 24 of 1999 concerning the flow of foreign exchange and the exchange 
rate system basically is a result of rewriting the Act no. 32 of 1964. The government 
considered that the old act no longer accommodated the rapid changes in financial 
transactions internationally. In particular, the BI had no authority to force banks to report 
their international transactions, which caused the foreign exchange flows. As a result, the 
BI could not control foreign exchange flows adequately. 
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The Act no. 24 of 1999 provides the BI with sufficient authority to control the 




a. Activities of the Foreign Exchange Conducted by Residents 
The Act no. 24 of 1999 allows the BI to request information concerning 
the movement of assets and financial liabilities conducted by residents. According to this 
act, the definition of ‘resident’ is, “ people, legal entity, and other entities that are 
domiciled or plan to domicile in Indonesia at least one year, including the representative 
and diplomatic staff of the Republic of Indonesia.” (Act no.24 of 1999, Art. 1) In 
addition, the act also requires the residents to report each time they have a transaction 
using foreign exchange. 
Considering the importance of foreign exchange in maintaining the 
stability of the Rupiah, uncontrolled foreign exchange flows increase the vulnerability of 
the Rupiah. Controlling residents who make foreign exchange in their business 
transactions is equally important in maintaining the stability of the Rupiah. 
b. Foreign Exchange Activities Conducted by Banks and NBFIs 
I 
The core objective of this act is to control the movement of foreign 
exchange conducted by banks and non-bank financial institutions. Since 1970, the 
Indonesian government has had a free-foreign exchange flow. Consequently, most banks 
and NBFIS sought offshore borrowings, and unfortunately they were not required to 
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report these activities. As a result, when the crisis occurred, the BI was unable to 
estimate total foreign debt accurately, which led to a crisis of confidence among creditors 
and residents. By establishing this act, number 24 of 1999, the government encouraged 
the BI to enhance its control of foreign exchange so that the same mistake will not be 
repeated. 
The Act no. 24 of 1999 requires banks and NBFIs to submit a formal 
report based on timely and valid data. Banks and NBFIs will be sanctioned for failure to 
submit a report. Incorrect data and any delays in submitting the report i s  subject to the 
BI's sanction. To illustrate, when banks and NBF'Is do not submit their report, they will 
be charged as much as Rp. 100 million and Rp. 20 million respectively. 
> 
D. SUMMARY 
In order to revive the banking sector, the government has established two strategic 
programs: recapitalizing and restructuring the banking system, which required a huge 
amount of money, and also improving the existing government's regulation of the 
banking system. 
The program of bank recapitalization and restructurization was intended to restore 
public confidence, especially for foreign investors. The stability of the domestic currency 
and transparency in the nation's payment system will encourage and invite foreign 
investors to conduct business in Indonesia. In turn, this will increase productivity. 
Promoting banking soundness is costly, and the cost is even higher to revive troubled 
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banks. This program of recapitalization and restructurization was viewed as the prime 
mover in attempting to recover from the financial crisis. 
Considering that the BI as the central bank bears heavy duties, the BI needed more 
authority and more independence. To provide the BI with legal foundations, the 
government has modified the existing laws. As a result, the government issued the 
following: Act no. 10 of 1998; Banking System, the Act no. 23 of 1999; Bank Indonesia, 
and the Act no. 24 of 1999; the foreign exchange flow. The BI now is more powerful and 
more independent than before. The next chapter will analyze the government policies in 
reviving the banking sector. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
The financial crisis in Indonesia was more complex than initially thought. 
Multiple causes, both external and internal were overlapping and ubiquitous. These 
created a lot of confusion, not only for the monetary authority, but also for businesses. 
The result was no single solution and the need for many years to recover. The IMF and 
the World Bank predicted that Indonesia needed at least three years to recover, but many 
domestic economic experts argued that Indonesia needed more time than the IMF’s 
prediction. 
Even though the government implemented various policies to stabilize the value 
of the Rupiah and to calm foreign creditors, the financial crisis damaged the fundamental 
economy deeply. To illustrate, the numbers of non-performing loans were rising, 
thousands of workers were laid off, and declining imports and exports eroded the 
government’s accountability. Moreover, many economic experts were criticizing the 
government because they believed some of the government’s policies were inappropriate 
and untimely. On the other hand, the government insisted that such policies were on the 
right track. 
In order to find out how effective the government’s performance was in handling 
the financial crisis, analysis is needed. Two aspects of the crisis were adressed by the 
government. 
Government Monetary Policy 
BankRegulation 
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A. ANALYZING THE MONETARY ASPECTS 
The government's policies in the monetary sector focused on stabilizing the value 
of the domestic currency. In conducting monetary policy, the government delegated its 
authority to the central bank, Bank Indonesia. 
During the financial crisis, the BI attempted various policies to regulate and to 
protect its mission and its duties. There was no doubt that some policies were really 
needed and suitable. But some of the policies were angering critics. Four of the BI's 
policies generated the most criticism: 
Imposing high interest rate 
Liquidity support program 
Dubious decision on the Exchange rate 
Establishment of the BRA 
1. Imposing High Interest Rate 
In the first quarter of 1998, the BI increased the interest rate until it reached 60% 
per m u m .  After that, private banks raced to increase interest rates to attract depositors, 
with the assumption that they still could expand their credit to domestic investors. Bank 
competition to offer higher interest rates to depositors forced the JIBOR (Jakarta 
Interbank Overnight Rate) to increase the interest rate even higher than private banks. The 
interest rate at JIJ3OR reached its peak at 350%. (The BI's annual report 199711998, p.13) 
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On the contrary, the banks' lending declined sharply since new borrowers were 
reluctant to request new credit. In addition, most corporations which were using high 
import contents were undergoing bankruptcy because they could not afford to purchase 
raw materials from abroad. Moreover, most large-scale private sector companies used 
short-term offshore loans to fund long-term projects. When those debts matured the 
private sector companies were not able to pay them. As a result, banks, which had 
guaranteed the debts of private sector companies, were forced to make payments for 
companies' debts. Unfortunately, banks also were having liquidity problems since non- 
performing loans were rising sharply, nearly causing the banks to collapse. (The BI's 
annual report 1997/1998, p. 14) 
Imposing high interest rates to protect the domestic currency in an open economic 
country is highly risky. As mentioned earlier, the monetary authority was no longer able 
to set the supply of money single-handedly, since many factors could affect it. By 
changing the initial interest rate, the BI altered the previous equilibrium point to shift to a 
new point of equilibrium. When the BI wanted to change the level of the interest rate, the 
BI should have considered some related factors. 
As illustrated in figure no. 1, the supply of money in circulation is fixed by the 
central bank and no other factors can influence it, so the supply of money curve is drawn 
vertically (MJ. The demand for money (L) is drawn downward sloping representing the 
negative relationship that an increase in the interest rate reduces the quantity of money 
demanded. According to the liquidity preference theory, if the interest rate is greater than 
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equilibrium level such, such as at rl, the quantity of money people want to hold (MI) is 
less than the level fixed by the central bank, and vice versa (Mankiew, 1998,~. 71 1). 






MI Quantityfixed M2 Quantity of 
by the BI(M) money 
Figure no. 1. Liquidity preference (Mankiew, 1998,~. 71 1) 
To reduce the money supply, the government increased the interest rate from the 
equilibrium point to the level at rl. That meant, other things held constant, the money 
supply would be reduced. In turn, a speculative attack on the domestic currency could be 
stopped. 
During the financial crisis, sixteen banks were closed and there was a rumor that 
the IMF was urging the government to close 42 more banks. This, of course, made 
people no longer want to deposit their money in banks. In addition, the Standard and 
Poor’s downgrading of the Indonesian banks caused people to panic. Having no faith in 
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banks and domestic currency led people to buy foreign currency, especially the U.S. 
r rl r (Initial 
Money demand) 
dollar. (Mann, 1998, p.52-71) 
F 
When the government increased the interest rate from r to rl, the money supply 
remained unchanged at a level of M. The demand for money no longer sloped 
downward, instead it remained at nearly a horizontal line because people did not want to 
risk losing their money. (See Figure no: 2) People preferred to hold onto their money 
although the interest rate had increased. The theory was not wrong but the people’s 
behavior had changed, so the outcome was totally different. It was obvious that imposing 
high interest rates without preserving public confidence could not help to absorb the 
money supply. 
Interest rates money supply 
M 
Quantity fixed 
by the BI 
Quantity of 
money 
Figure No.2. Liquidity preference with inelastic money demand (Mankiew, 1998, p. 
711). 
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Consequently, banks suffered because they had to bear a high cost on their 
borrowings from the central bank but were only earning a low rate of return on funds lent 
out to customers. Unfortunately, their lending credits dried up, since potential borrowers 
perceived higher interest rate as unfavorable. As a result, most banks were facing 
liquidity problems, even undergoing bankruptcy. The longer the government policy 
continued, the more banks underwent bankruptcy. 
2. Liquidity Support Program 
In order to survive, banks requested liquidity support from the BI. Otherwise they 
would collapse. Healthier banks, which previously guaranteed and funded weaker banks, 
were no longer able to conduct their activities unless the BI financially supported them. 
The BI, as the central bank, had to act as the lender of last resort and prevent banks from 
failure or collapse. That implies that the BI had to help banks by providing and 
distributing funds to them. Eventually, the BI launched a program, named “Liquidity 
Support of the BI” (BLBI). (Oppusunggu, 1999, p. 51) 
By the end of March 1998, the total amount of BLBIs distributed to banks reached 
Rp. 180 trillion. This program directly increased the total amount of the money supply. 
In December 1997, the total supply of money was Rp. 356 trillion, growing to Rp. 566 
trillion by the end of June 1998. Increasing the total supply of money reduced the value 
of money and increased the overall price level causing inflation. (Oppusunggu, 1999, p. 
5 1). 
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Figure no. 3. The Quantity Theory (Mankiew, 1998, p. 614) 
According to the quantity theory (Mankiew, 1998, p. 614), “the quantity of money 
available in the economy determines the value of money, and growth in the quantity of 
money is the primary cause of inflation.” As illustrated in figure no. 3, when the 
government distributed BLBIs to the banks that meant the government shifted the supply 
of money from M1 to M2. Since the demand for money remained unchanged, the 
equilibrium point shifted from point A (MSI equal to Rp. 366 trillions) to point B (MS2 
equal to Rp. 566 trillions). As a result, compared to previous years the value of money 
dropped from 95% at point A to 75% at point B, whereas the price of 1 gram of gold 
increased from Rp. 52, 600 to Rp.67, 110. This reveals the fact that inflation was rising 
sharply during the crisis, and apparently the BLBIs was the primary cause. In addition, 
the dry season was longer than normal, and this resulted in poor harvests and also caused 
thousands of acres of forest fires on Borneo island. The stocks of food declined in many 
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places and some demanded items vanished from the market. As a result, inflation was 
pushed even higher. 
The liquidity support program was criticized because the government was seen as 
being inconsistent in implementing its policies. On one hand, the government enacted 
the tight money policy to absorb the supply of money, but on the other hand, the 
government increased the supply of money by distributing BLBIs. The inconsistency of 
managing the supply of money was because the BI was trying to reconcile external 
pressures. For example, ten of the largest private banks, which had a close relationship 
with top-level government officials, faced serious liquidity problems. Under the 
government influence, the governor of the BI was forced to help those banks. Later on, 
the liquidity support program was perceived as a failure by the new government regime. 
In fact, the new regime tried to legally prosecute the former president. (Infobank, June 
1998) 
3. Dubious Decision on the Exchange Rate 
The rapid depreciation of the Rupiah in this short period, from mid 1997 with Rp. 
2,400 per US dollar to Rp. 10,500 per US dollar in early 1998, concerned the 
government, which was challenged to halt the continuing depreciation. Historically, in 
1970 the Indonesian government adopted a fixed-rate exchange system. It then moved to 
a crawl exchange system, which devaluated its currency at certain rates each five years, in 
the 1980s. In the 1990s it adopted a managed float system. Each system fit well in 
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certain circumstances, but none of these systems was suitable for halting the contagion 
effect of the Asian financial crisis. (The BI annual report 199711998) 
The minister of Finance submitted a proposal to the House of Representatives to 
stabilize the value of the Rupiah against the US dollar. The proposal said that the 
government would rather adopt the “Currency Board Arrangement (CBA)” to halt the 
monetary depreciation. The pros and cons of the government proposal of CBA led to a 
long debate and divergent solutions. Unfortunately, the debate, which took almost a 
month, was broadcast on all television channels and gave the impression that the 
government was confused. As a result, people lost confidence not only in banks but also 
in the domestic currency, the Rupiah. (The BI annual report 1997/1998) 
Finally, the govemment dropped the CBA proposal and adopted the free-float 
exchange rate system. The govemment was convinced that the CBA had weaknesses, 
primarily in the case of bank runs. A lender of last resort is not allowed by the CBA, 
meaning banks which had liquidity problems would suffer and even face bankruptcy 
without the central bank’s help. During the financial crisis, most banks had liquidity 
problems. If the government enacted the CBA, clearly most banks could not survive. 
(The BI annual report 199711998) 
Unlike the managed float-exchange rate, which forced the government to 
intervene in the market to defend the value of the Rupiah, the free-float exchange rate lets 
the market mechanism determine the value of currency. This meant that the government 
preferred to save its foreign exchange reserves for other purposes instead of defending the 
value of the Rupiah. Consequently, a larger depreciation would follow, causing people to 
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panic, especially the businesses that borrowed on offshore loans. But the dubious decision 
on the exchange rate system created a currency crisis not only for residents, but also for 
businesses. As a result, demand for the US dollars increased sharply. 
4. Establishment of the IBRA 
The BRA, a temporary non-profit organization, was established by the Act no. 10 
of 1998, under the command of the minister of the Finance (BPPN, 1999, p 7). Although 
the BRA had a legal foundation, it raised the question of whether the task of 
recapitalizing and restructuring banks should be given to the BI instead of the BRA. By 
establishing the BRA, the government bore the additional cost of hiring more employees 
and setting up their facilities. In addition, it was very risky to entrust a huge amount of 
money to a new organization, such as the ERA, which had no track record or experience. 
Further questions that had to be addressed included: Who were the right persons to handle 
this program? Would they be capable and honest in accomplishing the mission? 
The government contended that, by establishing the BRA the task of 
recapitalizing and restructuring banks would be accomplished successfully. In this case 
the government focused more on an effective approach, which meant doing what was 
right, rather than an efficient approach, which meant doing it right. Here are some of the 
reasons underlying the government’s decision: 1) By establishing the IBRA, the BI could 
focus on monetary policy. 2) The IBRA, under the control of the minister of the finance, 
would assume the special task of recapitalizing and restructuring banks. In line with the 
establishment of the BRA, the government also established a supervisory agency to 
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oversee the BRA. 3) The government was mimicking other countries in similar 
situations. Most countries which experienced a financial crisis preferred to establish a 
new organization to revive their banks instead of using the central bank. (BPPN, 1999, p. 
L 6) 
The recapitalization and the restructurization-banking program obviously needed 
a huge amount of money. Since this program was stated in the letter of intents with the 
IMF, the government had no choice but to implement the program. There was no 
question that this program dealt with a large number of banks nationwide. This program 
would lead to a condition in which a large number of banks would be closed and other 
banks would be taken over managerially, and the rest would follow the recapitalization 
program. The primary question was who was supposed to bear the huge cost, the 
government, the bank owners, or both? 
For the frozen banks which had been closed, the government was responsible to 
pay back the depositors and their clients. In other words, the government guaranteed the 
banks’ liabilities. As a consequence, the government took over those banks’ assets 
through the BRA. The BRA had to transfer the assets completely and was responsible 
for selling those assets to repay the government’s funds. Understanding that the banks’ 
liabilities were far greater that their assets, the government would bear a significant loss 
in the case of a bank closure. For the banks that were managerially taken over, the 
government occupied the banks and assisted the management to operate those banks. As a 
consequence, the government funded the recapitalization and restructurization program 
for those banks. In this case, the government faced a favorable situation compared to the 
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bank closure. For the banks that followed the recapitalization and restructurization 
program, the bank owners were required to fund as much as 20% of the total cost. (BPPN, 
1999, p. L- 17) 
Whatever the sources of the funds that were used for the recapitalization and 
restructurization program, this program absorbed enormous funds from the government’s 
budget. According to the BRA (1999, p. 43), “the estimated cost of the recapitalization 
and restructurization banking program would reach Rp. 637 trillion or 71% of the 
nation’s GDP.” The government was playing a dangerous game with the nation’s 
economy. It seemed that the recovery of the national economy depended on the success 
of the BRA in handling the program. Any obstacles which came up would slow down 
the recovery process. 
To assess the performance of the BRA in conducting its duties, two approaches 
can be used. First, examine the BRA’S ability to collect and recover the assets from the 
banks that had been closed and taken over. Second, evaluate the BRA’S ability to sell 
the assets to indigenous Indonesian businesses as top priority. 
According to the BRA, as written in the Rencana Strategis 1999-2004, (p. 43), 
“the BRA has been collecting assets with the estimated market price of as much as Rp. 
234 trillion.” That meant the BRA had collected assets equal to only 32% of the total 
cost of the government’s funds. Lower than 50% of asset divestment is considered far 
below the desired standard. All the government’s funds and spending must be reported to 
the people through the House of the Representative, but this reporting did not happen. 
Evidently, the government preferred to help the bank owners rather than the Indonesian 
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people. Also, it was obvious that the government made a responsive decision to satisfy 
the W ’ s  request rather than to protect the national interests. 
By September of 1999, the BRA had sold some assets for Rp. 612 billion, 
whereas the government targeted the BRA to obtain Rpi17 trillion for fiscal year 1999- 
2000. Indonesian businesses were still having liquidity problems, so selling assets to 
them was almost impossible. Additionally, foreign investors were reluctant to purchase 
those assets, believing that by waiting a while longer they could buy them at a lower 
price. In the first quarter of 1999, The BRA did not achieve the target for asset sales 
reaching only 3.6%. (BPPN, monthly report, September 1999, p. 24) Interestingly, by 
April 2000, the IBRA announced that it not only achieved but exceeded a target of 
Rp. 17.1 trillion. The BRA’S strategy for achieving the government target was explained 
in the IBRA press release: 
This target was reached through the contribution received from all the 
units in the BRA. The most important contributing factor is the sale of 
the Astra International shares. Following an open and fair tender process, 
BRA has sold 1,019,880,060 shares in the value of Rp.3.773 trillion. The 
Asset Management Unit Credit (AMC) contributed Rp. 7.25 trillion. This 
amount comes from loan collection and the sale of asset of Bank Papan 
Card Center. The Asset Management Investment Urht (AMI) contributed 
Rp. 3.79 trillion. This contribution comes from the sale of several assets 
under the Shareholder Settlement program of the former shareholders of 
frozen banks and bank taken-over. Other proceeds come from the Bank 
Restructuring unit, which contributed Rp. 5.11 trillion. The agency also 
received proceeds in the amount of Rp. 2.77 trillion from the fee paid by 
banks participating in the Guarantee Program. (IBRA, press release, April 
7,200(0 
This announcement showed that the BRA’S ability in asset divestment had 
satisfied the government standard. This ability to sell assets and repay the government’s 
funds based on a specific target is a useful measure of performance. Failure occurred if 
79 
the BRA was unable to achieve their target, while success occurred when it exceeded the 
target. The BRA’S performance was fair since it was able to satisfy the requirement. 
B. ANALYZING THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS 
The recapitalization and restructurization programs in the banking system 
conducted by the BRA, required actions to be taken promptly and accurately. Any 
delays in taking correcting actions would lead to a worse condition. However, making 
any decisions with inadequate consideration could produce effects that might create other 
problems. 
The BRA and the BI agreed that all banks located and operated in Indonesia 
should be examined before applying for the recapitaization and restructurization program. 
This examination was intended to determine whether a bank should be included or 
excluded from the program. Banks which failed the test would be forced to merge if they 
were state banks or would be forced to close if they were private banks. In line with the 
recapitalization and restructurization programs, the government issued a program named 
“Banking Soundness 2002.” The goal was that, by 2002, all banks which are located and 
operated in Indonesia would be financially and managerially healthy. (Infobank, June 
1999) 
Those programs for reviving the banking sector were widely supported by 
international financial institutions, such as the IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development 
Bank. This international support indicated that the government policies on the banking 
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system were on the right track. To analyze those policies, a closer analysis of two 
significant events is required: 
CapitaI Adequacy Ratio 
Fit & Proper Test 
1. Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Most developing countries which relied heavily on banks as financial 
intermediaries and part of the nation’s payment system were reluctant to liquidate or to 
close banks. The worst case of liquidating or closing banks created systemic risks that 
threatened the nation’s financial system as a whole. To illustrate, a bank failure directly 
impacts other healthier banks since their businesses are closely linked financially. In 
addition, a bank failure erodes public confidence and may provoke a generalized bank 
run. In turn, banks would face liquidity and solvency problems that may induce a credit 
crunch. The collapsed banks would damage the nation’s economy as a whole. @IS, 
1999, p.36) 
According to the “Competitive Theory” (Monetary and Economic Department of 
Basel, Switzerland, 1999, p. 36) the best way to improve efficiency and enhance 
productivity in industry nationwide is to allow individual f m s  or businesses, including 
banks, to fail. Allowing the weakest banks to exit the industry increases the overall 
efficiency. Maintaining the failing banks might cause a greater loss. If banks collapsed, 
all liabilities and their various debts would be the government’s responsibility. 
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The government, through the BRA, has actively and directly influenced the 
banks’ condition. The BRA employed a theory of “Capital Injection” which allowed 
pumping capital directly to the troubled banks. Under this theory, the BRA categorized 
banks into three groups: 
Healthy banks, which were strong enough to survive without government’s 
capital injection; 
0 Viable banks, which required the government’s capital injection in order to 
survive; 
Frozen banks, unlikely to survive even with substantial government 
assistance. 
In determining how to make a distinction between those categories, the BRA 
adopted the international standards of minimum requirements of the “Capital Adequacy 
Ratio (CAR).” It is also called the “regulatory capital requirement,” which is defined as 
the minimum amount of capital required to be maintained or the bank will usually require 
supervisory interventions. (BIS, 1999, p. 1) 
The capital requirement was further explained by Estrella (1995, p. 2). The 
capital requirement consisted of three basic components: a definition and measurement of 
assets, a measure of exposure to risk that capital is intended to cover, and the relationship 
between those two amounts. To calculate the capital regulatory requirement for a bank, 
first determine the total assets of the bank, consisting of core and supplemental assets. 
Second, calculate the total risk, consisting of risk-weighted assets plus the market risk. 
Last, divide total assets by risk-weighted assets plus market risk to determine the 
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regulatory capital requirement. In short, capital requirement can be measured by two 
formulas : 
Core Assets + Sumlemental Assets 
Risk Weighted Assets + Market Risk 
Core Assets 
Risk Weighted Assets + Market Risk 
>= 8% 
>= 4% 
The IBRA set the required minimum at 4% (the second equation). There was no 
question that the process of grouping the three categories was conducted fairly. As stated 
in the previous chapter, the result of this grouping of 128 private banks was that 74 
passed, 37 were viable, and 17 were troubled. The IBRA closed 38 banks, which 
consisted of 17 troubled banks and 11  viable banks, that were unable to pay the 
preliminary cost of the recapitalization and restructurization programs. (BPPN, 1999, p. 
L- 18) 
2. Fit & Proper Test 
The basic reason the “fit & proper test” is vital is that the recapitalization and 
restructurization program involved the government’s funds. The fit & proper test not only 
examined the financial condition of a bank, but also examined and evaluated its 
management, board of directors, and stakeholders. It was thought that for a funded bank 
to achieve the minimum requirement of 4% CAR was useless if the bank’s management, 
board of directors or stakeholders abused or violated prudent banking practices. 
Therefore, the government had a right to ensure that its funds were used appropriately. 
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Through the Joint Decision between the Minister of Finance and governor of the BI no. 
52/KMK.017/1999 and no. 31/11/KEP/GBI, the fit & proper test was formalized as a 
performance measurement of a bank and also as a supervisory instrument of the BI. The 
fit & proper test has three objectives (Infobank, June 1999): 
To examine whether or not the bank’s management, board of directors and its 
stakeholders abused their power for their own .benefits and violated prudent 
banking practices. 
To examine whether the bank’s financial condition was healthy. 
To examine whether or not the bank’s business plan was on the right track and 
would lead to achieving the CAR requirement by 2001. 
To carry out the fit & proper test, a team was established, named the “Technical 
Committee,” which consisted of eight personnel. The members of the team included 
representatives of the BI, the B R A ,  and Department of the Finance. In conducting its 
work, the team invited a foreign consultant as its advisor. The foreign consultant was Mc 
Kinsey, the biggest company in management consulting in the United States. In addition, 
as written in the Joint Decision above, independent observers were included in the 
process of examining and evaluating the fit & proper test. Therefore, the fit & proper test 
was conducted professionally. 
a. Examining & Evaluating the Bank’s Management 
The bank weaknesses, perceived as the core of the financial crisis in 
Indonesia, were due to either poor internal control or poor supervision by the BI. Most of 
the failed banks which were closed by the government failed caused their managers, 
84 
board of directors, and their stakeholders deliberately abused and violated prudent 
banking practices. As a response to this situation, the government, through the fit & 
proper test, would exclude bank managers who failed the test. . 
The "Technical Committee" set up some criteria for examination and 
evaluation of a bank's management (Infobank, June 1999). 
a) Submitting a written commitment to the BI and the BRA, concerning the 
manager's willingness to join the recapitalization and restructurization programs. 
Whether or not their name was listed on the "Bad Managers List" or if they had 
resign to avoid being considered for inclusion. The BI and the ERA set the 
following criteria to be listed on the bad managers list: 
b) 
0 Manipulated data that caused their bank to suffer. 
Made fictional transactions either on the asset side or on liability side on the 
bank's balance sheet. 
Colluded with the bank's clients, eroding the bank's wealth. 
Allowed internal frictions that slowed down the bank's business plan. 
c) 
Whether or not their bank was on the list of the "non-performing loans list." 
d) 
prudent banking practices. 
Submitted inaccurate periodic reports, by window dressing or data manipulation. 





Whether or not the bank’s management ignored and violated risk management 
f )  
performing their duties. 
Examining the capability, integrity, and independence of the managers in 
The government believed that improving the managers’ skills and their 
accountability was critical in promoting banking soundness. Therefore, it was reasonable 
that the fit & proper test would be conducted annually. By August 2, 1999, the fit & 
proper test for all directors, commissioners, and bank owners of the 74 healthy banks 
(totaling around 700 people) had been completed. The result was that 194 people 
conditionally passed, 38 people failed the test, and the remaining passed. The 38 people, 
who did not pass the test consisted of 17 bank owners, 7 commissioners, and 14 directors. 
Those people were forced to resign. (BI, press release, 1999) 
Unfortunately, the result of the fit & proper test was not widely publicized 
nationwide. There was no clear reason why the press did not disseminate this news. 
Consequently, the bank community responded negatively, especially the people who did 
not pass the test. Several newspapers, in an expression of bankers’ dissatisfaction, 
highlighted allegations of unfair treatment by the BI and the BRA. Transparency and 
dissemination of information had to be taken into consideration if the government wanted 
to restore public confidence. Critics of the government policy would slow the 
government programs. 
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b. Examining the Bank’s Business Plun and Due Diligence 
The examination of the bank’s business plan basically focused on how to 
best conduct the bank’s business and how to achieve the CAR requirement. If the bank’s 
business plan would not guarantee achieving the 4% CAR requirement by 2001, that bank 
failed the test. In addition, if the bank’s management was unable to pay 20% of the 
preliminary cost of the recapitalization and restructurization program to the BRA, the 
bank was also considered to have failed the test. In other words, banks had to satisfy both 
of the requirements. A bank unable to satisfy the requirements was given a chance to be 
included in the recapitalization and restructurization programs, if the bank was able to 
pay the preliminary cost and obtain 4% of CAR within three years. 
In assessing a bank’s business plan, the BRA evaluated the possibility of 
the bank achieving future profits. The BRA adopted a model expressing capital change 
as dependent on a bank’ financial state and the capital target set in the business plan. 
(Basle committee, 1999, p. 12) This model can be described by the equation: 
Y(t) - Y(t-1) = a! (YD(t) - Y(t-1) + u (t) 
= Actual capital of a bank 
YD(t) = Bank‘s capital target at time t 
Y(t-1) = Actual capital of previous year 
u(t) = Randomerror 
notes: Y(t) 
I 
a! = A positive parameter 
According to this model, the growth rate of capital follows a linear function. That means 
this equation can predict the bank’s future capital or expected capital in the next year 
based on the current growth of capital. 
87 
In line with the examination and evaluation of the banks’management and 
business plan, the DBRA also exercised “financial due diligence.” Financial due diligence 
has many meanings; it is not a pass- fail process. It calls for judgment, not only verifying 
facts that have been disclosed, but also uncovering those that have not. In other words, 
financial due diligence is about managing risks. 
The BRA’S financial due diligence process included investigating the 
bank’s core assets, its liabilities and the responsibility of its shareholders. The first step 
was to investigate the frozen banks which were closed by the government. The second 
step focused on the viable banks, and finally the healthy banks. By April 25, 2000, the 
BRA had completed the financial due diligence report for the 38 frozen banks, as 
reported by the IBRA: 
The IBRA has completed Financial Due Diligence reports on frozen 
banks. Firm legal action, commercially or criminally, would be taken 
against the former shareholders that would not complete negotiations with 
the BRA by July. The total obligation of the 38 frozen banks was Rp. 55 
trillion. The obligation arose from the BLBIs and Government Guarantee 
Program. The BLBIs of the frozen banks that has been cessie-ed was about 
Rp. 17.320.989 million, whereas Rp. 17.953.740 million in the BI’s 
account. (Based on the Joint Decree of the Coordinating Minister of 
Economy, Finance, and Industry No. 12/M.EKUIN/O4/2000 dated 7 April 
2000, on Principles in Completing Obligations to the Government). The 
former shareholders have to settle their obligations in accordance with the 
BLBI received from or funds paid by the Government under the 
Government Guarantee Program on payment obligations of public banks. 
(Press release, April 25,2000) 
The fit and proper test, if it is implemented seriously, appropriately, and widely, should 
encourage and restore public confidence. But the fit and proper test alone cannot 
guarantee the BRA can succeed in restoring public confidence. Law enforcement is 
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required to ensure that any violations, either commercial or criminal should be 
prosecuted. 
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VI CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. OVERVIEW 
The Indonesian financial crisis began to surface and spread nationwide in the 
middle of 1997, causing deterioration of the nation’s fundamental economy. The 
Indonesian people saw that their national financial crisis resulted from the contagion 
effects of the Asian financial crisis. Evidently, prior to the financial crisis, most people, 
including both businesses and foreign investors, had limited access to information about 
their banks’ stability. Poor supervision and inadequate law enforcement by the BI were 
coupled with weak internal control. These facts made it difficult for the public to 
determine whether a bank was in healthy or in poor condition, or even facing bankruptcy. 
When neighboring countries devaluated their currencies, the Indonesian monetary 
authority, the BI, faced stronger pressures on the currency. Foreign investors started to 
dump their equity shares and abandon the region, including Indonesia. This resulted in a 
high demand for U.S. dollars. Concurrently, most Indonesian private sector debts, which 
were from offshore loans, were maturing and had to be repaid. As a consequence, 
massive dollar buying was intensifying the demand for the U.S. dollar, forcing the 
Indonesian monetary authority to devaluate the Rupiah even further. 
As the Rupiah was devalued, many large-scale corporations, which imported raw 
materials fiom abroad, stopped their production because they were unable to purchase the 
raw materials, as prices were skyrocketing. The chain effects were severely damaging 
and created economic turmoil, such as high inflation and more non-performing loans. 
Thousands of workers were laid off, and the equity market plummeted. Unfortunately, 
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the supply of dollars was limited since the private sector’s debts were even greater than 
the nation’s foreign reserves. The result was tragic. The value of the Rupiah sank 
dramatically in a short period of time from Rp. 2,400 per a US dollar in early 1997 to Rp. 
17,000 per a US dollar by the middle of 1998. 
Since the economic problems were so complex and overlapping, in the early 
stages, the government’s policies were based on situational judgment, treating the 
immediate symptoms, which caused other problems to arise. For example, to reduce the 
money supply the government imposed a high interest rate which created liquidity 
problems. And then, to solve the liquidity problems the government launched Liquidity 
support program, which created high inflation. While the government attempted to 
implement its policies, the government was also formulating the process of problem 
identification that led them to acknowledge the root of the causes. These causes could be 
grouped into two categories, the external causes, which were described in chapter two, 
and the internal causes, which were explained in chapter three. 
To quell the economic turmoil, especially in the financial sector, the government 
enacted two major policies: recapitalization and restructurization of the banking system, 
and improving the legal foundation of the monetary authority by modifying the existing 
regulations for the banking system. 
B. CONCLUSION 
Analyzing the government’s policies in response to the financial crisis from the 
monetary point of view would lead to a judgment that the monetary authority’s ability to 
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act was affected greatly by its degree of independence from the government, which 
changed when a new regime came to power . In the early stages of the government 
efforts to overcome and to resolve the financial crisis during the old regime, the 
government acted as a “fire fighter,” simply trying to contain the damage as soon as 
possible, regardless of the underlying root of the problems. Unfortunately, the monetary 
authority was not making good decisions, since it received a lot of pressure from many 
parties, including the top level of government. As a result some policies were 
implemented based on situational judgment, which in turn created other problems. For 
example, bank closures initially were intended to avoid a greater loss since these banks 
earned a negative profit. But when these banks were closed, the market responded 
negatively and the outcomes were counter-productive. People no longer had faith in 
banks and began withdrawing their money. This resulted in liquidity problems for the 
banks. Second, when the BI adopted a tight money policy by imposing high interest rates 
to protect the domestic currency from being attacked by speculators, this caused banks to 
bear a large negative spread, which created a big negative profit, and dried up their credit. 
Third, the Bank Indonesia Liquidity Program (BLBI) was intended to save banks from 
collapse due to illiquidity, but this created the problem of increasing inflation. 
When the new regime rose to power, it began to improve the legal foundation of 
the monetary authority to make decisions by clarifying its power and duties and 
protecting it from external intervention or pressures. The legal foundation was stated in 
several acts, such as: the Act no. 10 of 1998 on Banking System; the Act no. 23 of 1999 
concerning Bank Indonesia; the Act no. 24 of 1999 on Foreign Reserves Flow and 
Exchange Rate System. 
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Analyzing the government’s policies from a financial point of view leads to a 
judgment that the government, through the BRA and the BI, had acted correctly and 
appropriately. The BRA, in the name of the government, made decisions based on an 
academic approach and complied with international standards. In other words, the BRA 
was performing its duties professionally, for example, grouping banks into three 
categories based on the minimum CAR requirement. In addition, the BRA and the BI 
employed a fit & proper test not only as a supervisory instrument, but also as a second 
filter for moving banks toward banking soundness. 
Based on the analysis above, the government’s policies in a response to the 
fmancial crisis were on the right track. Although accomplishment of the recapitalizing 
and restructuring of the banking sector was seen as a sluggish process, the BRA asserted 
that by 2004 this program would be completed satisfactorily. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there were several factors that could not be 
avoided by the monetary authority that slowed the speed of the process of reviving the 
banking sector. First, political pressures, which consisted of government intervention and 
political instability, obviously reduced the momentum of the process. Secondly, a lack of 
transparency caused people and foreign investors to lose trust in the government’s 
accountability. 
To amplify and to accelerate the recapitalizing and restructuring process, the 
BRA together with the BI should have advertised the results of each step of the programs 
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to the public. By disseminating information to the public, it would have created a shared 
vision between the government and the people, in turn increasing the government’s 
accountability. In addition, keeping the BI and the ERA independent from external 
pressures would create a conducive environment for them to perform their duties 
optimally. Under political pressure, certainly the BI and the ERA would fail to responsd 
and to make appropriate decisions. 
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